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According to a quote attributed to numerous philosophers and political leaders, 
“History is written by victors.”1 In the legal battle over same-sex marriage, those 
opposed to marriage equality have attempted to disprove this age-old adage. In re-
sponse to the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges2—which held that state laws 
banning same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment—each of the four 
dissenting Justices issued his own dissenting opinion. Every one of these dissents 
misrepresented the circumstances and precedent leading up to the Obergefell deci-
sion. Collectively, the Obergefell dissenters have valiantly tried to rewrite America’s 
legal, constitutional, and social history, all in an attempt to justify denying civil rights 
to same-sex couples.  
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In Obergefell, the Supreme Court struck down the same-sex marriage bans of 
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee by holding that such marriage restrictions 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Justice Kennedy 
began his substantive analysis by observing that “the Court has long held the right to 
marry is protected by the Constitution.”3 Justice Kennedy discussed “four principles 
and traditions” that “demonstrate[d] that the reasons marriage is fundamental under 
the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”4 These included indi-
vidual autonomy, the support for an important two-person union for committed cou-
ples seeking companionship and mutual caring, the fact that marriage would help 
protect the children being raised by same-sex couples, and that denying same-sex 
couples the state-sanctioned benefits of marriage inflicted both material and stig-
matic harm on gay Americans. Justice Kennedy concluded that “the right to marry is 
a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same sex 
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”5 The decision meant that no state 
could deny same-sex couples the right to marry.6  
Each of the four dissenting Justices in Obergefell authored his own written dis-
sent, each joined by at least one of the other dissenters. A common theme running 
through the dissents was an appeal to history, including American history, world his-
tory, Blackstone, the Magna Carta, and Edward Coke’s 1797 commentary on English 
law.7 History was important to many of the dissenters because of their professed 
commitment to originalism. Given their purported reverence for history, it is perhaps 
surprising that each of the dissenting opinions misrepresented fundamental features 
of the history leading to marriage equality for same-sex couples. In order to argue 
that the Obergefell majority overstepped its institutional bounds, the dissenting Jus-
tices distorted the history of marriage through the millennia, the history of marriage 
in America, constitutional history, gay history, and the history of the political debate 
over same-sex marriage. Through their collective revision of history, the dissenters 
sought to make the Obergefell decision appear both unnecessary and far more ex-
traordinary than it actually is. 
Methodically unpacking the content of the Obergefell dissents reveals a system-
atic and consistent distortion of American history both early and recent. This Article 
seeks to blunt the coordinated efforts by the losers to rewrite the history of same-sex 
marriage in America. Part One of this Article discusses the dissenters’ claim that 
throughout history across all civilizations, marriage has had only one unchanging 
definition: a union between one man and one woman. In addition to disregarding 
polygamous cultures, the dissenters’ claimed single historical definition of marriage 
is also abbreviated. Marriage was not simply a union between a man and a woman; 
for more than a century, marriage in America was officially defined as a union be-
tween a man and a woman of the same race in which the woman was legally subor-
dinate to the man. The dissenters omitted or downplayed the racial restrictions and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Id. at 2598. 
 4. Id. at 2599. 
 5. Id. at 2604. 
 6. Id. at 2607 (holding that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to 
marry in all States”). 
 7. Id. at 2632–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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gender ramifications of marriage—which courts played a major role in eliminating 
—in order to make Obergefell’s elimination of gender restrictions on marriage seem 
unprecedented. 
Part Two explains how the Obergefell dissenters misrepresented the history of the 
substantive due process doctrine. While Justice Thomas essentially denied that the 
doctrine exists, Chief Justice Roberts’s recitation of the history of substantive due 
process is particularly deceptive. Justice Roberts analogized Obergefell to Lochner 
and its progeny, claiming that Lochner provides the only substantive due process 
precedent for the Obergefell opinion. In an effort to make the entire doctrine seem 
indefensible, they disregarded all of the non-controversial cases that have relied upon 
substantive due process, including Loving, which provided a much closer analogy to 
the facts of Obergefell than did Lochner.  
Part Three discusses how the Obergefell dissenters presented an overly optimistic 
portrait of the lives of same-sex couples who cannot legally marry. The dissenters 
asserted—without any evidence or citations—that unmarried same-sex couples can 
live together, raise children, travel, execute enforceable legal documents, and hold 
themselves out as married, all without repercussions or interference from the state. 
Part Three explains how these claims are facile and often untrue. 
Part Four examines the national debate over same-sex marriage that culminated 
in the Obergefell opinion. The dissenters argued that the debate was respectful and 
not anti-gay. Part Four shows how the drive to ban same-sex marriage was largely 
driven by animus toward gay Americans. It illustrates how opponents of marriage 
equality routinely slurred gay Americans as immoral, as demeaning marriage, and as 
child molesters. The debate could hardly have been less respectful. 
Finally, the Article concludes by speculating why the Obergefell dissenters mis-
represented the histories of marriage, substantive due process, gay life in America, 
and the debate over same-sex marriage. It posits that the Obergefell dissenters sought 
to make constitutional protection of gay Americans seem unprecedented, to make 
gay Americans seem undeserving of equal rights, and to make opponents of gay 
rights seem noble. To create these illusions, the Obergefell dissenters had to distort 
the historical record. This Article seeks to set that record straight.  
I. THE DISSENTS’ REVISIONIST HISTORY OF MARRIAGE 
Chief Justice Roberts began the first Obergefell dissent by asserting that always—
and across all cultures—marriage has had one unchanging definition. In response to 
the majority’s acknowledgement of the longevity and ubiquity of marriage across 
human societies, Roberts declared that “[f]or all those millennia, across all those civ-
ilizations, ‘marriage’ referred to only one relationship: the union of a man and a 
woman.”8 Thus, “marriage as the union of a man and a woman,” according to 
Roberts, is a “universal definition of marriage.”9 The other dissenters, too, treated 
this definition of marriage as constant across all societies.10 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Id. at 2612 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. at 2613. 
 10. Id. at 2636 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Laws defining marriage as between one man 
and one woman do not share this sordid history. The traditional definition of marriage has 
prevailed in every society that has recognized marriage throughout history.”); id. at 2630 
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The dissenting Justices attempted to use history to set the stage for accusing the 
Obergefell majority of upending a definition of marriage that has remained in 
place—unaltered—since the dawn of recorded history. However, their brief history 
of the so-called “universal definition of marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman”11 is simplistic and flawed. For example, this static vision of marriage ig-
nores polygamy, which has been historically common in many cultures and practiced 
(at some point) in most societies.12 Moreover this static definition overlooks those 
societies that have recognized same-sex relationships, including Roman, African, 
and Native American nations.13  
Roberts’s assertion of a historically unanimous, unchanging definition of mar-
riage—between one man and one woman—is particularly perplexing because when 
it suited his needs he acknowledged the existence of polygamous cultures. Later in 
his dissent, Roberts raised the specter that Obergefell could create a slippery slope 
toward constitutionally-protected plural marriage when he menacingly suggested 
that “from the standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage 
to same-sex marriage is much greater than one from a two-person union to plural 
unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around the world.”14 This admis-
sion—in the form of a red herring15—disproves his opening gambit of presenting a 
solitary universal definition of marriage between one man and one woman. Roberts 
ignored polygamy when he incorrectly asserted an absolute singular historical defi-
nition of marriage, but he then invoked the “deep roots” of polygamous cultures 
when it was convenient to use polygamy as a scare tactic against marriage equality.16 
A. The Statutory History of Marriage in America 
In addition to incorrectly claiming a universal and timeless definition of marriage 
across all human civilizations, Roberts also asserted that the definition of marriage 
within the United States had remained unchanged since the founding of the Republic. 
                                                                                                                 
 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat was, until 15 years ago, the unanimous judgment of all gen-
erations and all societies, stands against the Constitution.”). 
 11. Id. at 2613 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 12. See Michael G. Myers, Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy: Homosexual Sod-
omy . . . Gay Marriage . . . Is Polygamy Next?, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1451, 1458–59 (2006) (“Of 
1170 societies recorded in the punch-card version of Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, polyg-
amy is practiced in 850. Indeed, polygamy is a common thread that has woven itself through 
almost all religions and cultures at one time or another.”). 
 13. See ABA Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding 
Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 344 (2004) 
(“In second-century Rome, marriage contracts between two men of the same age were permit-
ted . . . .”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993). 
 14. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 15. See Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead 
Us Down A Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101, 
104 (2006) (explaining why allowing same-sex marriage will not lead to polygamy). 
 16.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[F]rom the standpoint of 
history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater 
than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures 
around the world.”).  
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The Chief Justice defined marriage as “the union of a man and a woman” and he 
claimed that “[t]his singular understanding of marriage has prevailed in the United 
States throughout our history.”17 His singular definition, however, fails to account 
for the historic definition of marriage in American states that comprised of both racial 
restrictions and gender consequences that no longer exist. While Roberts is correct 
that the law defined marriage as between a man and a woman, he truncated the his-
torical definition, which defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman of 
the same race in which the woman is subordinate to the man. The legal definition of 
marriage today is quite different from the institution of marriage that prevailed in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century America.  
The Obergefell dissenters tried to create the illusion that the legal definition of 
marriage in America—and, indeed, all societies—has been static. That is untrue. In 
America, miscegenation laws and coverture regimes were once part of the definition 
of marriage. The legal definition of marriage has, however, changed dramatically, in 
part, because of the role of courts in forbidding states from imposing certain re-
strictions on marriage. The Obergefell dissenters attempted to obfuscate the evolu-
tion of marriage law in America in order to make Obergefell seem like the first re-
definition of marriage in American history. Their attempt is misguided. 
1. The Historic Racial Definition of Marriage  
The Chief Justice argued that his universal definition of marriage prevailed even 
when a state’s statute did not explicitly define marriage to exclude same-sex couples. 
He asserted that “[t]he meaning of ‘marriage’ went without saying.”18 His approach 
is essentially that “everybody knows” the definition of marriage, which happens to 
be his definition of marriage. Yet Roberts largely ignored the fact that for most of 
the nation’s history, the definition of marriage in most states depended on race. It 
“went without saying” that if a white man had a wife, she was white as well. Courts 
ultimately played a key role in redefining this aspect of marriage.  
Until the twentieth century, most American states criminalized interracial mar-
riage.19 Although racist policies like miscegenation laws are generally associated 
with the South, states from coast to coast, and from the Mexican border to the 
Canadian border, prohibited interracial couples from marrying.20 Those states that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 18. Id. at 2614. 
 19. Christopher R. Leslie, Justice Alito’s Dissent in Loving v. Virginia, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
1563, 1564 (2014). 
 20. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 43 (2000) 
(“Community sentiment against whites marrying African Americans was not limited to the 
south in the antebellum decades. Intermarriage bans and penalties echoed each other from state 
to state, north and south, east and west, together composing an American system.”); PEGGY 
PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN 
AMERICA 6 (2009) (“Miscegenation law reached well beyond the South. When the term ‘mis-
cegenation’ was invented, laws prohibiting interracial marriage were in effect not only there 
but also in Maine and Rhode Island; in Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio; in California, Nebraska, 
and Washington. By the end of the nineteenth century, the laws had spread to cover nearly all 
the states of the U.S. West . . . .”). 
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did not enact miscegenation laws had relatively small populations of African-
Americans.21 Every state with a black population of five percent or more legislated 
against interracial marriages.22 Having a small number of African-American resi-
dents did not, however, necessarily deter states from prohibiting these citizens from 
marrying white partners. North Dakota, for example, forbade interracial marriages 
even though the entire state was at that time home to but 201 black residents.23 
More importantly, in those states that did ban interracial marriage—which repre-
sented the vast majority of states—the racial restrictions were considered fundamen-
tal.24 Miscegenation laws were at the core of the definition of marriage.25 These atti-
tudes remained dominant well into the twentieth century. Reporting on the views of 
Caucasian Americans in 1944, social scientist Gunnar Myrdal concluded that “the 
ban on intermarriage and other sex relations involving white women and colored men 
takes precedence before everything else.”26 As late as the 1950s, the overwhelming 
majority of white Americans—over 92 percent nationwide and over 99 percent in the 
South—opposed interracial marriage.27 In the early twentieth century, a significant 
faction of African-Americans also opposed interracial marriage and supported mis-
cegenation laws.28 
American courts saw racial restrictions as inherent in the definition of marriage. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia argued that miscegenation laws were 
examples of positive law appropriately reflecting both natural law and God’s law 
because the “two distinct races . . . should be kept distinct and separate, and . . . 
connections and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them, 
should be prohibited by positive law, and be subject to no evasion.”29 Similarly, the 
Indiana Supreme Court upheld that state’s miscegenation law because “natural law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. See Sharp v. Perez, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 747 (1948) (Shenk, J., dissenting) (“The in-
frequency of such [interracial] unions is perhaps the chief reason why prohibitive [miscege-
nation] laws are not found in the remaining states.”). 
 22. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND 
ADOPTION 219 (2003). 
 23. Edward T. Wright, Comment, Interracial Marriage: A Survey of Statutes and Their 
Interpretations, 1 MERCER L. REV. 83, 88 (1949). 
 24. PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE AND 
LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 120 (2002) (“Racial segregation in marriage and the family 
became just as central a part of American apartheid as did segregation in trains or in schools.”). 
 25. As with same-sex marriage bans, many states amended their constitutions to prohibit 
interracial marriages. See FAY BOTHAM, ALMIGHTY GOD CREATED THE RACES: CHRISTIANITY, 
INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE & AMERICAN LAW 52–53 (2009). 
 26.  PASCOE, supra note 20, at 192 (quoting GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 60, 587 (1944)). 
 27. Leslie, supra note 19, at 1574 (citing RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: 
SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 85, 88 (2003)); PASCOE, supra note 20, at 206–07; 
Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and 
Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1181 (2009). 
 28. PASCOE, supra note 20, at 183 (discussing the positions and influence of Marcus 
Garvey). Many African-Americans held complicated opinions, opposing both interracial mar-
riage and miscegenation laws. CHARLES FRANK ROBINSON II, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: SEX AND 
LOVE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 115 (2003). 
 29. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878). 
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which forbids [racial] intermarriage and that social amalgamation which leads to a 
corruption of races, is as clearly divine as that which imparted to them different na-
tures.”30 This nineteenth-century reasoning lasted well into the twentieth, as the trial 
judge in Loving v. Virginia again upheld the Virginia miscegenation law, asserting 
that “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he 
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrange-
ment there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races 
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”31 Even those who did not view 
miscegenation laws as required by religious doctrine relied on natural law to justify 
prohibiting interracial marriages.32 
Just as the Obergefell dissenters claimed that all societies and civilizations pro-
hibited same-sex couples from marrying,33 supporters of miscegenation laws simi-
larly claimed a universality to racial restrictions on marriage. For example, the 
Supreme Court of Indiana asserted that marriage “is a public institution established 
by God himself, is recognized in all Christian and civilized nations,” and implied that 
no “civilized nation” would allow interracial marriage.34 In upholding miscegenation 
laws, state courts also thought that such laws were universal across the country. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld that state’s miscegenation law in 1871, by incor-
rectly observing that also prohibiting interracial marriage “were the laws of the 
British Colonies in this country, reenacted after the separation by the thirteen States. 
. . . And such, indeed, we believe was the law of every State.”35 Though widespread, 
miscegenation laws did not taint the penal codes of every state.36 Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming majority of states defined marriage as a function of race and precluded 
interracial marriage. At the time, this race-based definition of marriage was not con-
sidered controversial. 
In some ways, America’s history of criminalizing interracial relationships has 
been lost. Although miscegenation laws are well known to historians, “most [w]hite 
Americans somehow managed to forget how fundamental they had once believed 
these bans to be and, moreover, managed to persuade themselves that they, and their 
government, had always been firmly committed to civil rights and racial equality.”37 
The Obergefell dissenters seem to fall into this category of Americans, unaware of 
the critical importance of miscegenation laws in defining the legality of marriage for 
much of American history.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 404 (1871). 
 31. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting trial judge). 
 32. PASCOE, supra note 20, at 1 (“Between the 1860s and the 1960s, Americans saw their 
opposition to interracial marriage as a product of nature rather than a product of politics.”). 
 33. See supra notes 8–16. 
 34. Gibson, 36 Ind. at 402–03. 
 35. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287, 311 (1871). 
 36. BOTHAM, supra note 25, at 52–53 (“In the history of the American colonies and states, 
only eight never restricted or banned interracial relations: Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin.”). 
 37. PASCOE, supra note 20, at 291–92. 
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2. The Gendered Consequences of Marriage  
Traditionally, the definition of marriage included not only which couples were 
allowed to marry, but also the legal consequences of marriage. In defending the con-
stitutionality of California’s miscegenation law, the dissent in Sharp v. Perez38 artic-
ulated the then-prevailing wisdom that “[t]here can be no doubt as to the power of 
every country to make laws regulating the marriage of its own subjects; to declare 
who may marry, . . . and what shall be the legal consequences of their marry-
ing. . . .”39 These legal consequences were wildly different for the husband and the 
wife in a marriage. 
American states historically defined the institution of marriage in a manner that 
legally subordinated wives to their husbands.40 Such relegation was by design, not 
happenstance.41 States employed coverture laws as the primary mechanism of this 
subordination. Coverture laws provided that “[t]he legal existence of a woman was 
suspended by marriage”42 because the wife’s “legal and economic identity was sub-
sumed by her husband’s upon marriage under the doctrine of coverture.”43 As histo-
rian Norma Basch explained, marriage “law created an equation in which one plus 
one equaled one by erasing the female one.”44 
Coverture laws put wives under the legal control of their husbands.45 A married 
woman could not enter a contract without her husband’s consent.46 Although an un-
married woman could own personal property, if she married, her property became 
her husband’s, and he had sole authority to control its use and transfer.47 Addition-
ally, all of the wife’s future earnings and labor were automatically her husband’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. In Sharp v. Perez, the California Supreme Court became the first state high court of the 
post-Reconstruction era to hold miscegenation laws unconstitutional. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
 39. Id. at 37 (Shenk, J., dissenting). 
 40. Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Height-
ened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1118 (2014) (“First, the one man-one woman model 
of marriage has historically assumed and perpetuated the subordination of women to men.”). 
 41. Id.; see COTT, supra note 20, at 3. 
 42. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 908 (Vt. 1999); NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE 
LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17 (1982) 
(“The doctrine of marital unity not only mandated the wife’s subservience to her husband, but 
it also held the distinction of obliterating her legal identity.”). 
 43. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 958, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010); COTT, 
supra note 20, at 52–53; HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 115–22 (2000)). 
 44. BASCH, supra note 42, at 17. Blackstone, whom Justice Thomas referred to with rev-
erence, declared, “[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law.” HARTOG, supra 
note 43, at 106.  
 45. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
187, 199 (“[M]arried women were civilly dead and subject to the control of their husbands.”). 
 46. Baker, 744 A.2d at 908; COTT, supra note 20, at 11–12 (“Coverture in its strictest 
sense meant that a wife could not use legal avenues such as suits or contracts, own assets, or 
execute legal documents without her husband’s collaboration.”); Leslie, supra note 40, at 1119. 
 47. See Leslie, supra note 40, at 1119 (“Upon marriage, the wife’s prior personal property 
that she brought into the marriage, including her money and jewelry, became her husband's 
absolute property.” (citing BASCH, supra note 42, at 51; COTT, supra note 20, at 12)). 
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property.48 The husband had the legal authority to dictate his wife’s religious beliefs, 
to decide where the couple would live and raise their family, and to physically disci-
pline his wife.49 A wife could not initiate litigation unless her husband consented.50 
This effectively prevented wives from suing their husbands for any torts including 
abuse and rape.51 The marital rape exception—which lasted well into the 1970s in 
many states, and into the 1980s in some states, and “effectively gave a husband the 
legal right to rape his wife”52—was essentially a vestige of the coverture regime that 
survived the enactment of laws that eventually gave wives property rights. 
Harkening back to his contention that everybody knew and shared the same defi-
nition of marriage, Chief Justice Roberts tried to diminish the social and legal signifi-
cance of coverture laws by asserting that “[i]f you had asked a person on the street 
how marriage was defined, no one would ever have said, ‘Marriage is the union of a 
man and a woman, where the woman is subject to coverture.’”53 If he is correct, it is 
only because—to quote the Chief Justice—it “went without saying”54 that marriage 
eliminated a woman’s independent legal identity.  
For most of their existence, coverture laws were not controversial. Rather, they 
were considered foundational and integral to the definition of marriage.55 Coverture 
represented a national model of marriage.56 The fact that marriage eliminated “a 
woman’s legal and economic identity” was a “once-unquestioned aspect of mar-
riage.”57 Coverture laws both reflected and reinforced “what was then considered a 
natural division of labor between men and women.”58 As such, they proved hard to 
displace. Even as women gained rights, wives sometimes did not. For example, just 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. COTT, supra note 20, at 12 (“The legal meaning of coverture pervaded the economic 
realm as well. Upon marriage a woman’s assets became her husband’s property and so did her 
labor and future earnings. Because her legal personality was absorbed into his, her economic 
freedom of action was correspondingly curtailed.”). 
 49. Leslie, supra note 40, at 1119; HARTOG, supra note 43, at 116, 153, 166. 
 50. See Leslie, supra note 40, at 1119 (citing Baker, 744 A.2d at 908; COTT, supra note 
20, at 11–12). 
 51. Leslie, supra note 40, at 1121; Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 593 n.22 (Md. 
2007); COTT, supra note 20, at 162. 
 52. Leslie, supra note 40, at 1121 (2014) (citing COTT, supra note 20, at 211; HARTOG, 
supra note 43, at 162, 306–07) (“A man does not commit rape by having sexual intercourse 
with his lawful wife, even if he does so by force and against her will.”). 
 53. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2614 (2015) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 2614. 
 55. Leslie, supra note 40, at 1119 (“Coverture was seen as a cornerstone to American 
marriage law.”). 
 56. COTT, supra note 20, at 3 (“Political and legal authorities endorsed and aimed to per-
petuate nationally a particular marriage model: . . . [including] for the husband to be the family 
head and economic provider, his wife the dependent partner.”); see also HARTOG, supra note 
43, at 123 (“The received law of nineteenth-century America provided powerful images of a 
wife reduced to the possession of her husband.”). 
 57. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992–93 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 58. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 959; HARTOG, supra note 43, at 165 (“The law of coverture 
rationalized and justified a structure of power. It existed for husbands as a ruling class, ex-
pressed a particular male vision of responsibility and duty and power.”). 
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as miscegenation laws remained in place following the Fourteenth Amendment,59 
coverture laws survived the Nineteenth Amendment,60 even though so-called “mari-
tal unity” had been used to “explain[] the impossibility of suffrage for women.”61 In 
short, marriage was legally defined as an institution in which wives were officially 
subservient to their husbands.62  
Controversy arose when women’s rights advocates began to dismantle the cover-
ture system by lobbying for Married Women’s Property Laws, which “abolished the 
common law fiction of a single marital entity.”63 State legislators predicted that al-
lowing wives to own property would lead to “infidelity in the marriage bed, a high 
rate of divorce, and increased female criminality.”64 When women’s advocates suc-
cessfully undermined the coverture regime through the enactments of Married 
Women’s Property Laws, state court judges went to great lengths to retain coverture, 
including by declaring some aspects of Married Women’s Property Laws unconsti-
tutional. And “by professing their faith in the propriety and the desirability of the old 
common law fiction of marital unity, and by applying that fiction to the countless 
situations the statutes did not spell out, these judges eviscerated the spirit and intent 
of the legislation.”65 Even when states treated a wife’s income earned outside of the 
home as her separate property, “courts strongly tended to interpret a wife’s household 
work as belonging to her husband, whether she was undertaking tasks for family 
members or keeping boarders or lodgers or washing laundry as a way to generate 
income.”66 Courts still considered interspousal immunity a core part of marriage law. 
For example, in interpreting the District of Columbia’s version of a Married 
Women’s Property Law, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1910 refused to believe that leg-
islators intended such “radical and far-reaching changes” as to allow a battered wife 
to sue her abusive husband.67 Some judges defended coverture as necessary to keep 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. See infra notes 108–16 and accompanying text. 
 60. COTT, supra note 20, at 168 (“The nineteenth amendment did not fully dismantle cov-
erture. Laws to ensure that wife’s earnings belonged to her (rather than her husband) spread at 
a much slower pace, and more unevenly, than the lifting of other property constraints, because 
of the assumption that a husband owned his wife’s labor.”). 
 61. HARTOG, supra note 43, at 106. 
 62. Leslie, supra note 40, at 1119 (citing BASCH, supra note 42, at 17). 
 63. In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 804 (Bkr. W.D. Mich.), rev’d, 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 
2004). 
 64. EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS 64 (2004) (citation omitted); COTT, supra 
note 20, at 52–53. 
 65. BASCH, supra note 42, at 202–03; see also Joseph A. Ranney, A Fool’s Errand? Legal 
Legacies of Reconstruction in Two Southern States, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 48 (2002) 
(“In some states, enactment of married women’s property laws was followed by a period of 
conservative judicial reaction and limitation of laws.”). 
 66. COTT, supra note 20, at 168–69; id. at 169 (“Legal writers who meant to stress the 
economic emancipation of the wife had to concede that ‘the courts have jealously guarded the 
right of the husband to the wife’s service in the household’ as a part of the legal definition of 
marriage.”). 
 67. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910); see id. at 619 (“We do not believe 
it was the intention of Congress, in the enactment of the District of Columbia Code, to revo-
lutionize the law governing the relation of husband and wife as between themselves.”); COTT, 
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wives legally controlled by their husbands.68 
The elimination of coverture changed the legal definition of marriage from an 
institution in which a man legally controlled a woman to a more equal association.69 
Complementing the legislative enactment of Married Women’s Property Laws, 
courts played a significant role in redefining marriage away from the coverture 
model. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court “abolished common-law doctrines 
arising from the common law theory that husband and wife were one person and that 
the wife had no independent legal existence.”70 When the vestiges of coverture lasted 
well into the modern era, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1981 struck down Louisiana’s 
so-called “head and master” statutory scheme, which granted a husband the unilateral 
right to dispose of jointly-owned property without his wife’s consent.71 The rise and 
fall of coverture regimes shows the legal definition of marriage changing in a 
fundamental way over time,72 and it shows courts first defending and then helping to 
dismantle the system of coverture.73 
B. The Constitutional History of Marriage in America 
Not only did the Obergefell dissenters misrepresent the historical definition of 
marriage, they often wrote as if they were unaware of the constitutional history of 
marriage jurisprudence. All four dissents made some variation of the argument that 
the Obergefell majority overstepped its authority because the federal judiciary should 
play no role in defining marriage. Roberts, for example, argued that “[t]he funda-
mental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition 
of marriage.”74 Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito all opined that “the people” get to 
                                                                                                                 
 
supra note 20, at 162 (noting that the Thompson Court was concerned that “[a]llowing inter-
spousal tort suits would encourage wives and husbands to bring marital spats into the public 
spotlight, unnecessarily and inappropriately. Without even glancing at the way such public 
restraint perpetuated male dominance in the married couple, the court alluded to divorce as the 
remedy available to a battered wife suffering ‘atrocious wrongs.’”). 
 68. Leslie, supra note 40, at 1120 (citing Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 294, 308 (1858); 
BASCH, supra note 42, at 140). 
 69. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992–93 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“As states 
moved to recognize the equality of the sexes, they eliminated laws and practices like coverture 
that had made gender a proxy for a spouse’s role within a marriage. Marriage was thus trans-
formed from a male-dominated institution into an institution recognizing men and women as 
equals.”). 
 70. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 909 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting the judicial abolition of interspousal immunity). 
 71. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981). 
 72. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (“These and other developments in 
the institution of marriage over the past centuries were not mere superficial changes. Rather, 
they worked deep transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed 
by many as essential.”). 
 73. Id. at 2604 (citing “precedents [that] show the Equal Protection Clause can help to 
identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty 
and equality under the Constitution.”). 
 74. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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define marriage.75 Indeed, Alito went so far as to assert that the Obergefell “decision 
usurps the constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the 
traditional understanding of marriage.”76 For Justices so concerned about the judici-
ary creating new rights, Alito’s assertion of a citizens’ “constitutional right” to define 
marriage is as perplexing as it is nonexistent.77 This section shows how the dissent-
ers’ constitutional arguments are completely at odds with the history of marriage 
jurisprudence, particularly Loving v. Virginia.78 
In the late 1950s, Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter wanted to get married. 
Richard was white and Mildred was black. Unfortunately, they lived in Virginia, a 
state that forbade and criminalized interracial marriage. The couple drove across the 
state line to Washington, D.C., which did not have a miscegenation law at that time, 
and were married. Upon returning to their home in Virginia, the newly married 
couple was indicted for violating Virginia’s miscegenation law.79 The Lovings pled 
guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail, which the trial judge suspended on the 
condition that the Lovings leave Virginia and not return as a couple for twenty-five 
years.80 
After their conviction, the couple challenged Virginia’s law as unconstitutional. 
Although the Virginia courts upheld the law, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Virginia’s miscegenation law violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court opined that “[t]he freedom 
to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”81 The Loving decision invalidated all of 
the remaining miscegenation laws in the country. 
The Loving opinion also provided the groundwork for courts to invalidate state 
restrictions on the right to marry unrelated to race. For example, in Zablocki v. 
Redhail,82 the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that denied permis-
sion to marry to people not in compliance with child support obligations. The Court 
reasoned that “the right to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”83 In Turner v. Safley,84 the 
Court extended Loving and Zablocki to prison inmates and struck down a Missouri 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . seizes for itself a 
question the Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a 
vibrant debate on that question.”); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The question in these 
cases, however, is not what States should do about same-sex marriage but whether the 
Constitution answers that question for them. It does not. The Constitution leaves that question 
to be decided by the people of each State.”) (emphasis in original). 
 76. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 77. If citizens had such a right, they would probably have had standing to defend 
Proposition 8 in court because the Ninth Circuit, by Justice Alito’s reckoning, violated their 
“constitutional right” to define marriage. Yet, the Supreme Court majority in Hollingsworth 
v. Perry found no such standing. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 78. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 79. Id. at 2–3. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 12. 
 82. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 83. Id. at 384. 
 84. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
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penal regulation that required inmates to establish “compelling reasons” in order to 
secure the necessary approval of the prison superintendent to get married.85 
The Obergefell dissenters repeatedly attempted to distract their readers from our 
nation’s history of miscegenation laws and other restrictions on marriage. Chief 
Justice Roberts, for example, asserted that “the ‘right to marry’ cases stand for the 
important but limited proposition that particular restrictions on access to marriage as 
traditionally defined violate due process. These precedents say nothing at all about a 
right to make a State change its definition of marriage, which is the right petitioners 
actually seek here.”86 Roberts ignored the fact that, for most of America’s history, 
marriage was “traditionally defined” as limited to same-race couples. His assertion 
that the Court’s prior marriage cases “say nothing” about making states change their 
definition of marriage is erroneous; the Loving decision compelled states with mis-
cegenation laws to abandon their traditional definition of marriage that excluded in-
terracial couples from marriage.87 
The dissenters’ overall theme that Obergefell was unprecedented is inconsistent 
with Loving and the history of federal marriage jurisprudence. Moreover, the dissent-
ers’ individual arguments were irreconcilable with the holding, the language, and the 
thrust of Loving. The following sections explain why. 
1. States’ Rights 
The dissenters argued that the Obergefell majority was undemocratic because it 
infringed upon states’ rights. Scalia, for example, quoted Windsor for the proposition 
that the “[r]egulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as 
a virtually exclusive province of the States.”88 Alito asserted that “[i]t is far beyond 
the outer reaches of this Court’s authority to say that a State may not adhere to the 
understanding of marriage that has long prevailed.”89 Roberts concluded that “[t]he 
fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its 
definition of marriage.”90 The dissenters saw the states as having broad rights to de-
fine marriage that the majority opinion had infringed upon.91 
The Obergefell dissenters’ insistence that the Supreme Court cannot force a state 
to change its definition of marriage is historically inaccurate because that is exactly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Id. at 95–99. 
 86. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2619 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (em-
phasis in original). 
 87. See James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation 
Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 114 (1993) (“To Southern whites desperately striving to preserve 
white dominance and white womanhood, and to others claiming that interracial marriage was 
against the will of God, a court decision legalizing miscegenation amounted to a fundamental 
change in the basic definition of marriage.”). 
 88. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013)). 
 89. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 91. See also id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he States are free to adopt whatever 
laws they like . . . .”); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution leaves that question 
to be decided by the people of each State.”). 
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what the Supreme Court did when it invalidated the miscegenation laws, which the 
Obergefell dissenters ignored or downplayed when each asserted that marriage in 
America had had a single, stagnant definition since the nation’s founding.92 The dis-
senters’ chorus that federal courts can play no role in how states define marriage is 
easily disproven by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia and its prog-
eny. The Supreme Court’s pre-Obergefell line of marriage cases—including Loving, 
Redhail, and Turner—had uniformly recognized a constitutional right to marry that 
states were forbidden from infringing by defining marriage in a manner that violated 
an individual’s freedom to marry. 
The Obergefell dissenters failed to see the irony of their states’ rights arguments. 
When the dissenters condemned the Obergefell majority for taking the ultimate de-
cision on the validity of same-sex marriages away from the states, the Justices appear 
oblivious to the fact that they were recycling the arguments used to defend miscege-
nation laws for over a century. When civil rights advocates began challenging state 
miscegenation laws in earnest following the end of the Civil War, states vigorously 
defended the criminalization of interracial marriage. The most common defense was 
based on states’ rights,93 namely that neither state nor federal judges had the authority 
to interfere with the prerogative of state legislatures to define marriage however they 
pleased, including prohibiting interracial couples from marrying. These arguments 
succeeded for nearly a century across all regions of the country.  
Some early court decisions took an almost apocalyptic view of judicial interfer-
ence with the definition of marriage. In 1871, for example, the Indiana Supreme 
Court opined that “[t]he right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, 
and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is of in-
estimable importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states suffer or permit 
any interference therewith. If the federal government can determine who may marry 
in a state, there is no limit to its power.”94 Other state supreme courts were less melo-
dramatic but no less unequivocal in their holdings that “[t]he power of each state to 
regulate and control marriages within its jurisdiction[] is as unquestionable as state 
sovereignty.”95  
Federal courts were of a like mind in deferring to states’ power to forbid interra-
cial marriages.96 Despite a few early isolated victories by civil rights advocates 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. Later in his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the Loving Court “struck 
down” “[r]acial restrictions on marriage,” but he failed to understand the simple fact that this 
meant the Supreme Court did “make a State change its definition of marriage,” something that 
he claimed the Supreme Court could not do when protecting the fundamental right to marry. 
Id. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 93. BOTHAM, supra note 25, at 131 (“In nearly every case—from Scott v. State of Georgia 
in 1869 to Loving v. Virginia in 1967—and in nearly every region of the country, the states’ 
right argument formed the most commonly cited legal basis for antimiscegenation statutes.”). 
 94. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 403 (1871). 
 95. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 178 (1883); see also Leslie, supra note 19, at 1590 
(“Most post-Reconstruction southern courts in miscegenation cases thought the supremacy of 
state sovereignty to be beyond question.”). 
 96. See, e.g., State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 763 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890); Ex parte Francois, 9 F. 
Cas. 699, 701 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879); In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262, 264 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871). 
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during Reconstruction,97 the states’ rights defense of miscegenation laws proved 
powerful well into the twentieth century, including in regions well beyond the former 
confederacy. In 1922, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld that state’s 
miscegenation law by reasoning that marriage “is peculiarly a matter of state regula-
tion.”98 More pointedly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1923 upheld its miscege-
nation law because “the laws regulating marriages come clearly within the police 
power of the state, and, in the exercise of the state’s sovereign right, it has the sole 
and only power within the state to regulate who shall, or who shall not, marry.”99 
Even as American troops fought in Europe to defeat the Nazi regime—and its racist 
laws, such as the Nuremburg Laws, which prohibited marriages between Jews and 
non-Jews—American judges continued to uphold the constitutionality of racist mis-
cegenation laws that prohibited marriages between whites and non-whites because, 
according to the Tenth Circuit in 1944, “a state is empowered to forbid marriages 
between persons of African descent and persons of other races or descents.”100 
The Obergefell dissenters’ invocation of state rights as a basis to uphold state bans 
on same-sex marriage is troubling for two reasons. First, as explained, this was the 
cornerstone argument used to defend miscegenation laws. Second, the Loving Court 
rejected the states’ rights defense of marriage restrictions. Like other states, for sev-
eral decades, Virginia had successfully defended its miscegenation law as within “the 
power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a mongrel 
breed of citizens.”101 Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Virginia’s lawyers cited the 
near century of federal and state judicial opinions upholding miscegenation laws as 
a valid exercise of state power, entitled to deference.102 The Loving Court unani-
mously rejected the state’s argument, holding that “[u]nder our Constitution, the free-
dom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and 
cannot be infringed by the State.”103 In sum, the Obergefell dissenters’ reliance on 
states’ rights arguments to justify deferring to state-imposed marriage restrictions is 
inconsistent with America’s constitutional history.104 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. BOTHAM, supra note 25, at 27. 
 98. Kirby v. Kirby, 206 P. 405, 406 (Ariz. 1922). 
 99. Blake v. Sessions, 220 P. 876, 879 (Okla. 1923). 
 100. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir. 1944). See also In re Shun T. 
Takahashi’s Estate, 129 P.2d 217, (Mont. 1942) (permitting state to not recognize marriage 
between a Japanese man and a white woman). 
 101. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955). 
 102. Brief for Appellee at 28–29, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 
WL 93641, at *28–29. 
 103. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 104. The states’ rights argument rings false when coming from Alito because he made the 
same arguments in Windsor, in which he voted to uphold the DOMA by which Congress com-
manded the federal government to ignore states’ definitions of marriage if a state protected 
marriage equality. Leslie, supra note 19, at 1589. Justice Alito’s assertion in his Obergefell 
dissent that the matter of same-sex marriage is better left in the hands of state legislatures and 
electorates is odd because the Windsor decision itself did not override the decisions of state 
legislatures. It would appear that Justice Alito believes that federal officials should defer to 
the state definition of marriage only when states discriminate against same-sex couples, not 
when states protect these couples. 
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2. Fourteenth Amendment 
The dissenters’ misunderstanding of the constitutional history of marriage extends 
to the Fourteenth Amendment itself. After striking an overarching theme that inval-
idating state marriage laws is antidemocratic, Justice Scalia proceeded to miscon-
strue the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Scalia correctly observed that 
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not mention marriage and, he argued, 
that a same-sex marriage ban “bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, 
widespread, and unchallenged use dating back to the Amendment’s ratification.”105 
He further argued that in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, “no 
one doubted the constitutionality” of gender restrictions on marriage that limited the 
institution to one man and one woman.106  Finally, Justice Scalia mocked the majority 
for having “discovered in the Fourteenth Amendment a ‘fundamental right’ over-
looked by every person alive at the time of ratification” and he sarcastically accused 
the majority of hubris for finding a right to marriage equality in the Fourteenth 
Amendment when “lesser legal minds—minds like Thomas Cooley, John Marshall 
Harlan, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, William 
Howard Taft, Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, 
and Henry Friendly—could not.”107  
Justice Scalia’s invocation of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment in order 
to deny that Amendment’s protections to same-sex couples suffers from several 
omissions and oversimplifications. First, conspicuously missing from Scalia’s screed 
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s (alleged) indifference to marriage restrictions is any 
reference to Loving. This oversight is intentional, no doubt, because Scalia could not 
reconcile his desire to discriminate against same-sex couples with the well-
established precedent that marriage restrictions can violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment’s omission of any reference to marriage 
applies equally to miscegenation laws. Under Justice Scalia’s approach, miscegena-
tion laws would be as constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as same-sex 
marriage bans, which Scalia argued were constitutional. 
Second, while Justice Scalia was safe in assuming that the 1860s politicians could 
not conceive of same-sex marriage when ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, we 
know with certainty that these legislators explicitly represented that the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not invalidate racial restrictions on marriage.108 The Republicans 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course, 
Scalia is wrong when he asserts that the same-sex marriage bans have an “unchallenged use,” 
as same-sex couples had been challenging these bans for over four decades. See, e.g., Baker 
v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Jones v. 
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974). 
 106. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When it comes to determining 
the meaning of a vague constitutional provision—such as ‘due process of law’ or ‘equal pro-
tection of the laws’—it is unquestionable that the People who ratified that provision did not 
understand it to prohibit a practice that remained both universal and uncontroversial in the 
years after ratification.” (citing Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818–19 (2014))). 
 107. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 108. Leslie, supra note 19, at 1583 (“Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not men-
tion marriage, miscegenation laws featured prominently in the congressional debates over that 
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championing the Fourteenth Amendment neither desired nor believed that the 
Amendment would affect miscegenation laws.109 Republican senators who vocally 
supported civil rights for black Americans simultaneously proclaimed the wisdom 
and constitutionality of miscegenation laws.110 Even black congressmen of the 
Reconstruction era working to pass federal civil rights legislation, such as South 
Carolina Congressman Joseph H. Rainey, assured their colleagues that “we do not 
ask . . . that the two races should intermarry one with the other. God knows we are 
perfectly content.”111 In short, in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress—
and the ratifying states—were focused on protecting racial (but not gender) re-
strictions on marriage. 
Although Justice Scalia is correct that the post-Civil War Congress did not intend 
the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate state marriage restrictions,112 he misread the 
significance of this fact and the implications of his own argument. Scalia’s interpre-
tation of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment mirrors the arguments 
made by champions of miscegenation laws. For example, the State of Virginia in 
Loving argued that the “States which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment clearly sig-
nified their intent by continuation of their anti-miscegenation laws contemporane-
ously with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.”113 The State directed the 
Loving Justices to the fact that “as late as 1951 . . . the list of States which ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that a majority of such States maintained their 
anti-miscegenation laws in force after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.”114 
The Loving Court unanimously rejected these arguments and refused to limit the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to the confines of nineteenth-century 
imaginations. 
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 113. Brief for Appellee at 28, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 
93641, at *28. 
 114. Id. 
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In reciting his legislative history, Scalia ignored the subsequent constitutional 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Scalia literally never mentioned Loving any-
where in his dissent. When Justice Scalia observed that “no one doubted the consti-
tutionality” of gender-based marriage laws, he omitted the fact that the constitution-
ality of race-based restrictions on marriage was similarly undisputed when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Justice Scalia was neither bold nor honest 
enough to admit that his constitutional philosophy would necessitate validating state 
miscegenation laws. Ultimately, Justice Scalia erred by focusing exclusively on the 
Fourteenth Amendment at the time of passage but ignoring the subsequent history of 
how the Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the Amendment to constitutional 
claims, including claims involving marriage.115 
Finally, Scalia’s invocation of great legal minds of the past who never recognized 
same-sex marriage is an interesting rhetorical flourish, but of no significance as none 
of these jurists ever considered the issue of same-sex marriage. While it is true that 
these judges did not strike down same-sex marriage bans, neither did they overturn 
any of the nation’s miscegenation laws.116 Does that somehow make the prohibition 
of interracial marriage constitutional? 
In sum, Scalia neither addressed the history of challenges to marriage restrictions 
under the Fourteenth Amendment nor explained why his imagined projection of the 
legal opinions of jurists past somehow estops current Justices from applying the prec-
edent of Loving to contemporary controversies. Scalia failed to consider—let alone 
appreciate—that his approach to applying the Fourteenth Amendment would render 
miscegenation laws constitutional. He cherry-picked historical facts that supported 
his desire to uphold same-sex marriage bans while failing to acknowledge that the 
cherries he picked would also demand upholding racist marriage laws. 
3. Framing the Marriage Question 
Even when not mentioning Loving directly, the Obergefell dissenters tried to ob-
fuscate the significance of Loving by framing the constitutional question in a manner 
that obscured how the Court had historically addressed questions involving marriage 
rights. They did so by asserting that the Obergefell petitioners were asking the Court 
to create a new a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. After asserting that “‘lib-
erty’ under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only those rights 
that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’”117 Justice Alito as-
serted that “it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not among 
those rights.”118 Chief Justice Roberts, too, argued that fundamental rights must have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. The reach of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to “only those practices, de-
fined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other 
rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.” Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992) (critiquing alternative viewpoint as “in-
consistent with our law”). 
 116. In contrast to same-sex marriage litigation, these judges lived in an era when misce-
genation laws were regularly challenged and consistently upheld as constitutional. 
 117. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)). 
 118. Id. (“For today’s majority, it does not matter that the right to same-sex marriage lacks 
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historical roots119 as he spoke about “the new right to same-sex marriage.”120 He was 
more subtle than Justice Alito who explicitly accused the majority of “invent[ing] a 
new right and impos[ing] that right on the rest of the country.”121 Framing the case 
as involving a new right to same-sex marriage would seem to make Loving distin-
guishable because the Loving Court never considered same-sex relationships and, 
thus, did not recognize a right to same-sex marriage.122 
If the dissenting Justices’ goal was to render Loving inapplicable to the constitu-
tionality of same-sex marriage bans, they failed for several reasons. First, Obergefell 
was never about creating a right to “same-sex marry.” Instead, the case was about 
the right to marry, which is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 
Loving never held that the right to heterosexual marriage is fundamental; the Loving 
Court held that the right to marry is fundamental. The state must have a compelling 
reason to infringe that right. A state law that denies couples this right to marry “can-
not be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is 
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”123 Obergefell did not create a new 
right, as such.124 Instead, the respondent states failed to justify denying an existing 
right—the fundamental right to marry—to same-sex couples.125 
Second, using the framing of the Obergefell dissenters, Loving itself would have 
upheld the constitutionality of miscegenation laws because the relevant question in 
Loving would have been whether—before Loving—the Constitution included a fun-
damental right to interracial marriage. Before the issuance of the Loving opinion, the 
answer would have been negative under the approach of the Obergefell dissenters. 
The right to interracial marriage was not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”126 The concept was not mentioned in the Constitution and most states pro-
hibited interracial marriage for most of American history; nor did the constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 
deep roots or even that it is contrary to long-established tradition.”). 
 119. Chief Justice Roberts opined that—to prevent substantive due process from being 
used a vehicle for “converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates”—fundamen-
tal rights must be “‘objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed.’” Id. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21). 
 120. Id. at 2625. 
 121. Id. at 2643 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 122. Some lower courts explicitly tried to distinguish Loving by reframing the marriage 
equality cases brought by same-sex couples as not about the right to marry but instead about 
the right to same-sex marriage, which was not an issue in Loving. Jackson v. Abercrombie, 
884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1097 (D. Haw. 2012). 
 123. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). 
 124. See generally Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper 
Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 685 (2008). 
 125. This is similar to the Loving Court’s invalidation of miscegenation laws because states 
could not justify denying the right to marry to interracial couples.  
 126. Leslie, supra note 19, at 1598 (“More importantly for our purposes, at the time of the 
Loving opinion, interracial marriage was certainly ‘not deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition.’ Miscegenation laws were older than the nation itself. Most of the original thir-
teen colonies prohibited interracial marriage or sex.” (citing COTT, supra note 20, at 43 (de-
tailing various prohibitions))). 
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drafters think that they were protecting such a right.127 Well into the mid-twentieth 
century, judges upheld miscegenation laws because of the nation’s historical prohi-
bition of interracial marriage.128 Even when states did not maintain active anti-
miscegenation regimes, this often did not indicate any support for interracial mar-
riage, let alone recognition of a constitutional right to marry across defined racial 
boundaries.129 This lack of historical protection or recognition of interracial mar-
riage, however, did not prevent miscegenation laws from violating the substantive 
due process clause.130  
Some Obergefell dissenters tried to evade this conundrum by misrepresenting the 
facts and context of Loving. For example, Justice Roberts sought to distinguish 
Loving by asserting that the case did not alter the definition of marriage because “the 
interracial marriage ban at issue in Loving [did not] define marriage as ‘the union of 
a man and a woman of the same race.’”131 Yet that is exactly what miscegenation 
laws—such as the Virginia law invalidated in Loving—did. It is absurd to assert that 
Virginia’s marriage statute did not define marriage as a function of race.132 
In short, the dissenters framed the constitutional question in Obergefell in a man-
ner entirely inconsistent with the Court’s approach in Loving. Loving did not create 
a fundamental right to interracial marriage; instead it held that the already-existing 
right to marry applied to interracial couples. Similarly, Obergefell did not create a 
new right to same-sex marriage; it simply held that the well-established right to marry 
extended to same-sex couples.133 The Obergefell dissenters misconstrued Loving in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Leslie, supra note 19, at 1598 (“Prohibitions in America against interracial marriage 
and intimacy date back to the 1600s.”) (citing BOTHAM, supra note 25, at 52); id. at 1598 
(“Between the nation’s unification in the 1770s and its temporary division in the 1860s, the 
nationwide coverage of miscegenation laws expanded and contracted, but was always exten-
sive.” (citing PASCOE, supra note 20, at 21)); id. at 1598 (“By 1860, the vast majority of states 
maintained miscegenation statutes . . . .”). 
 128. Id. at 1601–02. 
 129. Id. at 1598–99. 
 130. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (“[T]he fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a 
law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”). 
 131. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2619 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis in original) (quoting Irving G. Tragen, Comment, Statutory Prohibitions Against Inter-
racial Marriage, 32 CAL. L. REV. 269 (1944)); see id. (“Removing racial barriers to marriage 
therefore did not change what a marriage was any more than integrating schools changed what 
a school was.”). 
 132. Leslie, supra note 40. 
 133. In the future, same-sex marriage will just be seen as “marriage,” in much the same 
way that people don’t generally refer to married couples of different races as members of an 
“interracial marriage,” but simply as married. Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1163–64 
(S.D. Ind.), aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (“It is clear that the fundamental right to marry 
shall not be deprived to some individuals based solely on the person they choose to love. In 
time, Americans will look at the marriage of couples such as Plaintiffs, and refer to it simply 
as a marriage—not a same-sex marriage. These couples, when gender and sexual orientation 
are taken away, are in all respects like the family down the street.”). 
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order to construct their false frame and to make Obergefell’s extension of constitu-
tional rights to gay Americans seem more extraordinary than it was.134 
4. Attempts To Distinguish Loving 
Of the four Obergefell dissenters, Justice Thomas made the most direct attempt 
to distinguish Loving. He argued that three distinguishing features of Virginia’s mis-
cegenation law made Loving and its progeny distinguishable from Obergefell. In do-
ing so, he erred thrice. 
First, Thomas asserted that the pre-Obergefell troika of Loving, Zablocki, and 
Turner were distinguishable because they “all involved absolute prohibitions on pri-
vate actions associated with marriage.”135 As an initial matter, Thomas was wrong to 
characterize Turner as involving an “absolute prohibition” because the statute at is-
sue required inmates to show “compelling reasons” to obtain permission to marry. 
Similarly, the statute in Zablocki did not involve an absolute prohibition because 
individuals could marry by complying with child support obligations. More im-
portantly, Thomas did not explain how same-sex marriage bans did not also abso-
lutely prohibit same-sex couples from similar “private actions associated with 
marriage.”136  
Second, Thomas implied that the Court’s prior marriage cases involved criminal 
laws and that because same-sex marriage bans were civil, Loving and its progeny 
were inapplicable to Obergefell. He reported that the Lovings had been criminally 
prosecuted and that violation of the statute in Zablocki could result in unnamed 
“criminal penalties.” Thomas also noted that Turner involved a prison regulation that 
required state inmates to present “compelling reasons” in order to secure permission 
to get married—thus disproving his earlier claim that the case involved an absolute 
prohibition on marriage. Trying to emphasize this criminal angle, Thomas asserted 
that “[i]n none of those cases [Loving, Zablocki, and Turner] were individuals denied 
solely governmental recognition and benefits associated with marriage.”137 Thomas 
argued that because the Obergefell petitioners sought only recognition and benefits, 
they could not rely upon the Loving line of cases. 
Thomas’s attempt to distinguish Obergefell from Loving, Zablocki, and Turner 
by highlighting the criminal strand in the latter cases is unpersuasive. As an initial 
matter, Thomas misrepresented the facts of Turner when he claimed that the case did 
not involve an individual who was solely seeking “governmental recognition and 
benefits associated with marriage.”138 Unlike the Lovings, the inmate in Turner did 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. Under the approach of the Obergefell dissenters, all of the Supreme Court’s right-to-
marriage cases would have had to come out differently. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 
(“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage’; Turner did not ask about a ‘right 
of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child 
support duties to marry.’ Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehen-
sive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from 
the right.”). 
 135. Id. at 2636–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 2636.  
 137. Id. at 2637 (emphasis in original). 
 138. Id.  
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not risk criminal prosecution; he merely challenged the prison policy that required 
inmates to secure permission in order to exercise their right to marry. Similarly, in 
Zablocki, the respondent was suing because he was denied a marriage license, not 
because he had ever been threatened with any punishment.139 He—like the 
Obergefell petitioners—only wanted the recognition and benefits of marriage.  
Moreover, although some miscegenation laws had a criminal component, the 
Loving case was atypical; most challenges to miscegenation laws involved states re-
fusing to grant or recognize interracial marriages. For example, in 1942, the Montana 
Supreme Court invoked that state’s miscegenation regime to deny a surviving white 
wife’s rights regarding her husband’s estate because he was Japanese, even though 
the couple had married in Washington state where their marriage was legal.140 
Although that Montana case was not criminal, Loving overturned it. The Loving 
Court did not merely require states to stop criminalizing miscegenation laws; it re-
quired them to recognize all otherwise valid interracial marriages and afford all ap-
plicable benefits to married interracial couples. This is what the Lovings requested 
and what the Court granted them.  
Thus, even if Loving had a criminal origin, the holding applies to all civil contexts 
involving antimiscegenation regimes. While the miscegenation law at issue in Loving 
did have a criminal component, the Loving Court never mentioned this aspect of the 
law when it held that the right to marry is a “fundamental freedom” and that “classi-
fications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . surely . . . deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty with-
out due process of law.”141 Under Thomas’s interpretation, the Loving opinion would 
allow states to prohibit and to refuse to recognize interracial marriages so long as 
states did so through civil, not criminal, law. This is not what Loving held; the opin-
ion secured interracial couples the benefits of marriage, not simply immunity from 
criminal penalties. 
Furthermore, same-sex marriage bans in some states did implicate criminal law if 
a couple evaded the law by marrying someplace else and then returning home, just 
as the Lovings had done. For example, Wisconsin law prescribed a criminal punish-
ment of being “fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 9 
months or both” for “[a]ny person residing and intending to continue to reside in this 
state who goes outside the state and there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared 
void under the laws of this state.”142 Although Wisconsin’s district attorneys had not 
yet actively enforced the law against same-sex couples, conservative leaders in the 
state publicly advocated such enforcement143 and the risk of criminal enforcement 
deterred some Wisconsin same-sex couples from getting married in other states 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 376 (1978). 
 140. In re Takahashi’s Estate, 129 P.2d 217, 222 (Mont. 1942). 
 141. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 142. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.30 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015). 
 143. Louis Weisberg, Prisoners of Love: Despite New IRS Rules, Wisconsin Gay Couples 
Who File Joint State Taxes Could Face Jail Time, WIS. GAZETTE (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://wisconsingazette.com/2013/09/05/prisoners-of-love/ (quoting Julaine Appling, CEO of 
Wisconsin Family Council, who “advocated for the prosecution of same-sex couples under the 
marriage evasion law”) [https://perma.cc/3HZU-XYGT]. 
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because they feared prosecution in Wisconsin.144 Wisconsin was not alone in 
criminalizing the evasion of state marriage laws by getting married in another 
state.145 In short, the criminal undertones of Loving do not provide a sufficient basis 
for distinguishing Obergefell. 
For his third attempt to differentiate Loving and its progeny from Obergefell, 
Justice Thomas asserted that Virginia’s miscegenation statute was distinguishable 
from same-sex marriage bans because Virginia’s law “extended so far as to forbid 
even religious ceremonies, thus raising a serious question under the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.”146 Here, Thomas is grasping at straws. This 
aspect of Virginia’s miscegenation law played no role in the Loving opinion and can-
not be used to distinguish Loving from Obergefell. Moreover, Loving’s progeny did 
not involve any such religious restrictions and cannot be distinguished from 
Obergefell on these grounds.  
Perhaps more importantly, Thomas was apparently unaware that some same-sex 
marriage bans similarly constrained religious ceremonies. Some states, such as North 
Carolina, made it a criminal offense for “[e]very minister, officer, or any other person 
authorized to solemnize a marriage” to marry “any couple without a license.”147 
Clergy in North Carolina understood the statute “to make it unlawful for a pastor, 
priest, or rabbi to solemnize the marriage of same-sex couples.”148 Several states had 
similar laws, many of which provided for imprisonment of the officiant.149 Although 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. Stacy Forster, Wisconsin Gay Couples Who Marry Outside State Could Face Penalty, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 3, 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20160403194206/http:// 
www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/29412299.html (noting same-sex couple feared inability 
to afford costs of a legal defense); see also Weisberg, supra note 143 (“ACLU of Wisconsin 
executive director Chris Ahmuty said it’s not difficult to imagine a rogue district attorney 
apprehending a same-sex couple married out of state in order to make a statement or score 
political points, just as renegade county clerks in New Mexico and Pennsylvania are handing 
out marriage licenses to test the law in those states.”). 
Same-sex couples challenging this Wisconsin law were denied standing after the district 
attorneys for Milwaukee and Eau Claire Counties agreed not to prosecute these plaintiffs. Wolf 
v. Walker, No. 14-CV-64-BBC, 2014 WL 1729098, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 30, 2014). While 
this seems like a good result, judges and prosecutors have cleverly employed standing doctrine 
in the past to prevent gays from being able to challenge antigay laws. See Christopher R. 
Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing Doctrine To Insulate 
Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 29. 
 145. Forster, supra note 144. 
 146. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2637 n.6 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 147. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-7 (West 2013). 
 148. Thigpen v. Cooper, 739 S.E.2d 165, 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
 149. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. (2007) § 25-128 (“It is unlawful for any person who is author-
ized to solemnize marriages to . . . [s]olemnize a marriage without first being presented with 
a marriage license as required by the laws of this state.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-406 (West 
2006) (“If any such minister or officer shall presume to solemnize any marriage between par-
ties without such a license, or with knowledge that either party is legally incompetent to con-
tract matrimony as is provided for by the laws of this state, he shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor . . . .”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/219 (West 1999 & Supp. 2016) (“Any 
official issuing a license with knowledge that the parties are thus prohibited from marrying 
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such laws were not actively enforced, neither were they necessarily dead letters. For 
example, Wisconsin’s attorney general opposed efforts to enjoin enforcement of this 
section of the penal code against officiants who solemnize same-sex marriages.150 
Several clergy from various denominations were challenging North Carolina’s law 
when Obergefell came down and rendered their lawsuit unnecessary.151 
5. Summary 
Each of the dissenters concluded that the Obergefell decision was fundamentally 
antidemocratic. Chief Justice Roberts, for example, condemned the majority for re-
moving the issue of marriage equality “from the realm of democratic decision” and 
for “shutting down the political process.”152 The Justices condemned the purported 
antidemocratic nature of Obergefell with varying degrees of embellishment. In rela-
tively mild language, Justice Thomas asserted that the Constitution requires that “the 
definition of marriage to be left to the political process.”153 On the more extreme end 
                                                                                                                 
 
and any person authorized to solemnize marriage who shall knowingly solemnize such a mar-
riage shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.106 (West 
2005) (“Any clergyman or magistrate who shall join together in marriage, parties who have 
not delivered to him a properly issued license, as provided for in this act, or who shall violate 
any of the provisions of this act, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be pun-
ished by a fine of 100 dollars, or, in default of payment thereof, by imprisonment in the county 
jail for a term of 90 days.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 15 (West 2016) (“any person know-
ingly performing or solemnizing the marriage ceremony contrary to any of the provisions of 
this chapter, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished 
by a fine of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars 
($500.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than thirty (30) days nor more than 
one (1) year or by both such fine and imprisonment.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-31 (2013) 
(“If any marriage is solemnized without the license required by this title being procured, the 
parties so married and all persons aiding in such marriage are guilty of a Class 1 misde-
meanor.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-15 (West 2013) (“Any person who knowingly, with or 
without a license, solemnizes a marriage between two adults prohibited by law is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-28 (West 2016) (“If any person knowingly per-
form the ceremony of marriage without lawful license, or officiate in celebrating the rites of 
marriage without being authorized by law to do so, he shall be confined in jail not exceeding 
one year, and fined not exceeding $500.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.30 (West 2009 & Supp. 
2015) (“Any officiating person who solemnizes a marriage . . . knowing of any legal impedi-
ment thereto . . . shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500, or imprisoned not more 
than 6 months, or both.”). 
 150. Wolf v. Walker, 26 F. Supp. 3d 866, 870 (W.D. Wis.), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 151. Michael Gordon, United Church of Christ Sues over NC Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local 
/article9116723.html [https://perma.cc/A35J-MJQT]. 
 152. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also 
id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Obergefell majority were not “functioning 
as judges”). 
 153. Id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Had the majority allowed the definition of mar-
riage to be left to the political process—as the Constitution requires—the People could have 
considered the religious liberty implications of deviating from the traditional definition as part 
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of the hyperbolic scale, Justice Scalia quipped that a governmental system that per-
mitted judges instead of “the People” to define the constitutional parameters of mar-
riage “does not deserve to be called a democracy.”154 Justice Scalia concluded that 
the opinion constitutes a “threat to American democracy.”155 
The sturm und drang of the dissenters’ lament—that Obergefell portends the end 
of American democracy as we know it—is both overwrought and historically dis-
proven. The republic, after all, has survived the Loving decision’s removal of misce-
genation laws from the political process. Fundamental to the dissenters’ contention 
is their misrepresentation of the evolution of the legal definition of marriage in 
America and the role that courts played in redefining marriage. Properly understood, 
Obergefell is not an aberration but another point on the trajectory begun by Loving. 
II. THE HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS  
In addition to condemning constitutional protections for same-sex couples, the 
dissenting Justices argued that Obergefell resurrected what the dissenters character-
ized as the discredited doctrine of substantive due process. Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
concluded that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the 
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that 
liberty.”156 Although the opinion invoked both substantive due process and equal 
protection concepts, the Obergefell dissenters aimed their fire at the former.157 
Chief Justice Roberts sought to delegitimize the majority opinion by painting sub-
stantive due process as synonymous with repudiated Supreme Court opinions of the 
past. Roberts condemned the Obergefell majority by highlighting two infamous uses 
of the substantive due process doctrine in now-renounced cases. First, Roberts con-
demned the doctrine of substantive due process as commencing in the Supreme 
Court’s Dred Scott decision,158 which protected the rights of slaveholders to possess 
slaves.159 Dred Scott is universally condemned as one of the worst opinions ever 
issued by the Supreme Court. While the repulsive nature of Dred Scott is readily 
apparent, Roberts never attempted to explain how allowing loving couples to exer-
cise a constitutional right to marry was somehow analogous to allowing slaveholders 
to recapture and own other human beings. 
                                                                                                                 
 
of their deliberative process.”). 
 154. Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 2626. 
 156. Id. at 2604 (majority opinion). 
 157. This may be because substantive due process may prove more protective of gay rights 
than equal protection. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 509 (2005) (explaining why substantive due process was superior to 
equal protection as a mechanism to invalidate state sodomy laws). 
 158. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 763 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“For two centuries American 
courts, and for much of that time this Court, have thought it necessary to provide some degree 
of review over the substantive content of legislation under constitutional standards of textual 
breadth. The obligation was understood before Dred Scott . . . .”). 
 159. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
1032 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1007 
 
Second, Roberts invoked Lochner v. New York and its progeny. In the Progressive 
Era of economic regulation, the Lochner Court struck down a New York law that 
limited bakery employees to working no more than 60 hours per week, describing 
such regulation as “meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual.”160 
Roberts condemned Lochner for improperly constitutionalizing an economic philos-
ophy, quoting Justice Holmes’s Lochner dissent for the proposition that the Consti-
tution “is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.”161 Roberts lamented 
that “[i]n the decades after Lochner, the Court struck down nearly 200 laws as vio-
lations of individual liberty,” which had the effect of “empowering judges to elevate 
their own policy judgments to the status of constitutionally protected ‘liberty.’”162 
He claimed that during the 1950s and early 1960s, the Supreme Court had “recog-
nized its error” of the Lochner-era cases and had repudiated substantive due process 
as a doctrine.163 Roberts then asserted that Obergefell constituted a reversion to Loch-
ner. Most significantly, the Chief Justice proclaimed that “only one precedent offers 
any support for the [Obergefell] majority’s methodology: Lochner v. New York.”164  
Justice Thomas took Chief Justice Roberts’s indictment of substantive due pro-
cess one step further and claimed that the doctrine did not actually exist but was 
instead a “dangerous fiction.”165 He disparaged the doctrine for “distort[ing] the con-
stitutional text, which guarantees only whatever ‘process’ is ‘due’ before a person is 
deprived of life, liberty, and property.”166 The principal exhibit in his critique was 
the Obergefell decision, which Justice Thomas argued showed how judges invoke 
substantive due process to convert their “personal views” into constitutional law.167 
Thomas proclaimed the doctrine of substantive due process to be indefensible.168 
Although exercising different approaches, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas used their dissents to present an incomplete—and thus false—narrative of 
substantive due process. In doing so, they made several mistakes. First, Chief Justice 
Roberts erred when asserting that the contours and application of substantive due 
process are defined solely by Dred Scott and the Lochner-era cases.169 Roberts char-
acterized Dred Scott’s substantive due process analysis as lying dormant and then 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905). 
 161. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. 
at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Day–Brite Lighting, Inc. v. 
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 165. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.; see also id. at 2631–32 (“They ask nine judges on this Court to enshrine their 
definition of marriage in the Federal Constitution and thus put it beyond the reach of the nor-
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 168. Id. at 2632. 
 169. See generally Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 
120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010). 
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reappearing through Lochner and its kin.170 From Roberts’s opinion, it would appear 
that there were only two episodes of substantive due process in American legal his-
tory: Dred Scott and the Lochner-era cases. Roberts treated Obergefell as the final 
part of a Dred Scott-Lochner-Obergefell trilogy—a set of illegitimate opinions. 
Through selective citation, Roberts tried to present a history of substantive due pro-
cess that began with Dred Scott and ended with the demise of the Lochner era, only 
to be resurrected more than a half a century later by Obergefell. Roberts concluded 
that the Obergefell opinion’s “aggressive application of substantive due process 
breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled 
approach of Lochner.”171  
Chief Justice Roberts conspicuously neglects Supreme Court jurisprudence in the 
post-Lochner era, most notably Loving. The Loving decision had strands of both sub-
stantive due process and equal protection. Following its equal protection analysis, 
the Loving opinion explicitly held that Virginia’s miscegenation “statutes also de-
prive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”172 The Loving Court thus relied on 
substantive due process to recognize a fundamental right to marry and to strike down 
miscegenation laws even though “[m]arriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of 
Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century.”173 The 
doctrine of substantive due process helped remove miscegenation laws from the 
criminal codes of over a dozen states.174 
The fact that Loving was a substantive due process case exposes the inaccuracy 
of Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that Lochner is the “only . . . precedent [that] 
offers any support for the majority’s methodology” in Obergefell. Roberts claimed 
the need to ground legal doctrines in history,175 but then he sought to distort history 
by omitting the most relevant cases from his analysis. When looking for the 
appropriate analogy, the relevant question is whether marriage restrictions against 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Dred Scott’s holding was 
overruled on the battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after 
Appomattox, but its approach to the Due Process Clause reappeared. In a series of early 20th-
century cases, most prominently Lochner v. New York, this Court invalidated state statutes that 
presented ‘meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual,’ and ‘undue interfer-
ence with liberty of person and freedom of contract.’”). 
 171. Id. at 2618–19. 
 172. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 173. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992) (noting “the 
Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state inter-
ference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia”). 
 174. Ironically, Justice Thomas mocked the very existence of substantive due process. Yet 
he would be a felon but for the doctrine. Clarence Thomas is African-American, his wife 
Caucasian. It is the height of folly to belittle a legal doctrine as indefensible when one’s mar-
riage and freedom depends on that very doctrine. 
 175. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Proper reliance on history 
and tradition of course requires looking beyond the individual law being challenged, so that 
every restriction on liberty does not supply its own constitutional justification. . . . The only 
way to ensure restraint in this delicate enterprise is ‘continual insistence upon respect for the 
teachings of history . . . .’” (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment))). 
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same-sex couples look more like economic regulations or more like marriage 
restrictions based on race. The answer is self-evident: marriage restrictions 
(Obergefell) look more like marriage restrictions (Loving) than like economic 
regulations (Lochner). Roberts is distracting readers from the most relevant line of 
substantive due process authority by focusing exclusively on a discredited—and 
irrelevant—line of authority.  
Second, Roberts also ignored nonmarriage precedent. Well before Loving—and 
overlapping with the Lochner era—the Supreme Court employed substantive due 
process to outlaw racial segregation in the public schools of our nation’s capital,176 
to protect the rights of parents to direct their children’s education,177 to recognize the 
right to procreate,178 and to allow the teaching of foreign languages.179 These cases 
are uncontroversial.180 By claiming Dred Scott and Lochner as the only precedents, 
Roberts sought to erase these other noncontroversial uses of substantive due process 
from the historical record. 
Third, the modern era of substantive due process began in the 1960s and included 
far more than the Loving Court’s use of the doctrine to invalidate state miscegenation 
laws. In 1961, the Supreme Court in Poe v. Ullman dismissed a declaratory action 
challenging Connecticut’s prohibitions against using contraceptive devices and giv-
ing any medical advice regarding the use of such devices.181 Justice Harlan issued a 
powerful dissent that commended the substantive component of due process. He 
noted “[w]ere due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those 
situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by leg-
islation which by operating in the future could, given even the fairest possible pro-
cedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all 
three.”182 Harlan’s position ultimately carried the day in Griswold v. Connecticut,183 
in which the Court cited Harlan’s dissent while striking down Connecticut’s anti-
contraception law. Discussing Harlan’s dissent over three decades later, Justice 
Souter noted that “[t]he text of the Due Process Clause thus imposes nothing less 
than an obligation to give substantive content to the words ‘liberty’ and ‘due process 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). 
 177. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 178. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., 
concurring). 
 179. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–403 (1923). 
 180. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 863–64 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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one, were substantive due process decisions” (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499–500; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–403)). 
In addition to these now-uncontroversial decisions, the antagonists of substantive due pro-
cess have been more accepting of the doctrine when it served their policy goals. For example, 
when the five conservative Justices—including all four Obergefell dissenters—struck down 
Chicago’s handgun ban, they did so on reasoning that—while invoking the Second 
Amendment—was essentially substantive due process. See id. at 861 (“This is a substantive 
due process case.”). 
 181. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 498 (1961). 
 182. Id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 183. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). 
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of law.’”184 In the modern era of substantive due process ushered in by Harlan’s Poe 
dissent, Justices have invoked the doctrine to protect marital privacy,185 private sex-
ual conduct between consenting adults,186 personal decision making over medical 
treatment,187 against physical confinement,188 and the rights to custody of one’s chil-
dren189 and to control the upbringing of one’s children.190  
Each of these opinions soundly disproves Roberts’ insinuation that before 
Obergefell, substantive due process was used solely to protect slaveholders’ interests 
and to strike down reasonable economic regulations. The Supreme Court has decided 
a wide range of cases based on substantive due process. One branch of substantive 
due process cases has been widely discredited, namely those associated with the 
Lochner era. Yet another branch of cases are widely embraced; the Loving opinion 
today is uncontroversial. The Obergefell opinion follows much more in the proud 
tradition of Loving than the tyranny of Dred Scott or the excesses of Lochner. Yet 
Roberts downplays Loving in order to create a false analogy. 
Learning the history of substantive due process by reading the Obergefell dissents 
would result in a serious miseducation. Substantive due process is far more rich than 
Roberts suggests. The legal issue in Obergefell looks more like Loving than it looks 
like Lochner, but Chief Justice Roberts wants to distract the reader from Loving by 
emphasizing the red herring of Lochner. Through omission and sleight of hand, 
Roberts mispresented the history of substantive due process. This is no doubt due to 
his inability to properly distinguish Obergefell from Loving.191 
III. GAY LIFE BEFORE MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
In their dissents, both Roberts and Thomas pontificated on what they described as 
the unhampered ease of life for same-sex couples in America. Roberts asserted, with-
out any citation, that even without having any marriage rights, “[s]ame-sex couples 
remain free to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families 
as they see fit. No one is ‘condemned to live in loneliness’ by the laws challenged in 
these cases—no one. At the same time, the laws in no way interfere with the ‘right 
to be let alone.’”192 In a similar vein, Thomas claimed, also without any evidence, 
that same-sex couples enjoyed the full breadth of “liberty” because  
they have been able to cohabitate and raise their children in peace. They 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 764 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 185. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–91 (1977). 
 186. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003). 
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 190. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000). 
 191. See supra Part I.B. 
 192. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added) (citation omitted). 
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have been able to hold civil marriage ceremonies in States that recognize 
same-sex marriages and private religious ceremonies in all States. They 
have been able to travel freely around the country, making their homes 
where they please. Far from being incarcerated or physically restrained, 
petitioners have been left alone to order their lives as they see fit.193  
Thomas asserted that “States have imposed no . . . restrictions” that would limit same-
sex couples’ “ability to enter same-sex relationships, to engage in intimate behavior, 
to make vows to their partners in public ceremonies, to engage in religious wedding 
ceremonies, to hold themselves out as married, or to raise children.” 194 He further 
claimed that states had not “prevented [same-sex couples] from approximating a 
number of incidents of marriage through private legal means, such as wills, trusts, 
and powers of attorney.”195 Thus, in the dissenters’ view, same-sex couples led un-
troubled lives, largely unaffected by their inability to legally marry. This part shows 
how—and why—the Obergefell dissenters misrepresented how gay lives are lived in 
America. 
A. Difficulty of Gay Life 
Justices Roberts and Thomas recited a litany of privileges that they claimed same-
sex couples can exercise with impunity even without the right to marry. However, 
their blithe descriptions of the happy-go-lucky lives of gay Americans belie a funda-
mental misunderstanding of how state actors mistreat unmarried same-sex couples. 
In order to appreciate the errors in the dissents, the Justices’ claims need to be un-
packed and scrutinized individually. 
1. Living Together 
The Obergefell dissenters argued that same-sex couples do not need to be married 
because they can build homes together without marriage. For example, Roberts 
claimed that “[s]ame-sex couples remain free to live together.”196 Thomas similarly 
asserted that the “Petitioners . . . have been able to cohabitate . . . in peace.”197  
These claims are facile and false. First, the Obergefell dissenters were apparently 
unaware of how localities can use zoning ordinances to prevent unmarried couples 
from living together. Some cities restrict land use to single-family dwellings where 
family is defined as people related by blood, adoption, or marriage. Unmarried same-
sex couples do not constitute families in these jurisdictions and may legally be pro-
hibited from living together.198 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. Id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 2620 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 198. Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REV. 955, 
985 (2012) (“[S]ome American localities—usually suburbs and townships—have zoning and 
land use ordinances that de facto restrict, or even prevent, gay families from residing within 
them.”); id. at 985 n.119 (“The affluent suburb of Ladue, Missouri, denied a residency permit 
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of such ordinances.199 As a result, “in thousands of communities across the country 
where single family dwelling ordinances are in force, same-sex couples cannot live 
together with any degree of constitutional protection.”200 Modern courts have sug-
gested that these zoning restrictions survive Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated 
state sodomy laws.201 Indeed, the year before Obergefell was decided, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court upheld a residential zoning restriction that excluded same-sex cou-
ples.202 In addition to zoning restrictions, the inability to marry could prevent same-
sex couples from living together in public housing or some university housing.203 
Thus, Roberts and Thomas were mistaken to assert that unmarried same-sex couples 
can necessarily live together wherever they please. 
Second, for same-sex couples raising children, the denial of marriage rights can 
preclude a couple from living together. Many gay Americans have their own biologi-
cal children from prior heterosexual relationships, often marriages. When such cou-
ples divorce, custody battles sometimes ensue. When they do, judges often condition 
the gay parent’s access to his or her child on that parent not residing with a same-sex 
partner. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a magistrate’s order that a 
father’s right to visit his own children was conditioned on his “‘not residing in the 
same house with his male partner’ during those visits.”204 Such conditions are all too 
common205 and are applied to same-sex partners but not opposite-sex partners.206 As 
a result, courts in custody cases can essentially force unmarried same-sex couples to 
break up or at least not live together. If these same-sex couples were legally married, 
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 205. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (finding mother in 
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 206. See, e.g., Lacey v. Lacey, 822 So. 2d 1132, 1137 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). 
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judges would have less latitude to exercise their own prejudices or to use societal 
prejudice as an excuse for discriminating against same-sex couples in custody 
battles.207  
Third, in the absence of marriage, some nursing homes have separated elderly 
same-sex couples. Many nursing homes refuse to let unmarried same-sex partners 
live together in a dual-occupancy room and some forbid them from being in the same 
nursing care facility altogether.208 One case illustrates the problem vividly. Clay 
Greene and Harold Scull had been partners for over twenty years when Scull, eighty-
eight at the time, fell down the front steps of their home and injured himself. After 
Clay summoned an ambulance, county and health care workers blocked Clay’s ac-
cess to Harold in the hospital. The county demoted Clay to roommate status, got 
temporary authority to revoke Clay’s power of attorney to make decisions for Harold, 
and then “arranged for the sale of the men’s personal property, cleaned out their 
home, terminated their lease, confiscated their truck, and eventually disposed of all 
of the men’s worldly possessions, including family heirlooms, at a fraction of their 
value and without any proper inventory or determination of whose property was be-
ing sold.”209 The county forced Clay out of the couple’s home and confined him in a 
different nursing home from Harold. The men were prevented from seeing each other 
for the last three months of Harold’s life when Harold died alone in a nursing home 
that refused to let him see his partner of twenty years.210 The legal documents that 
the couple had faithfully executed did nothing to replicate the rights that married 
couples receive automatically. 
The ballad of Clay and Harold is extreme but, unfortunately, not unique. In one 
instance when a nurse assistant happened upon a pair of elderly male residents having 
sex, the officials separated the men immediately and transferred one of the men “to 
a psychiatric ward, where he was placed in four-point restraints, based on the patient’s 
‘deviant behavior.’”211 Some nursing homes completely ban same-sex partners,212 
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while others prevent them from having conjugal visits.213 Being involuntarily 
separated from one’s partner is a constant risk, and often a painful reality, for many 
gay people in nursing homes.214 In short, the Obergefell dissenters’ blithe assertion 
that unmarried same-sex couples can live together is too often not true. 
2. Raising Children 
The Obergefell dissenters declared that marriage rights did not affect gay couples’ 
ability to parent. Roberts asserted same-sex couples denied the right to marry could 
still “raise their families as they see fit.”215 Thomas similarly alleged that states have 
not restricted the ability of same-sex couples “to raise children.”216 In particular, 
Thomas claimed that the “Petitioners . . . raise their children in peace.”217 The Justices 
offered no citations or support for their claims. This is understandable, because their 
claims are false. 
The inability of same-sex couples to marry both complicated and thwarted the 
adoption process in many states. In some states, same-sex couples were statutorily 
prohibited from adopting.218 However, even states that allowed gay individuals to 
adopt sometimes banned gay couples from adopting, meaning that an adopted child 
could only have one parent.219 Other states prevented adoption by a gay co-parent by 
forbidding second-parent adoptions, in which a person can adopt his or her partner’s 
biological (or adoptive) child, unless the parents are legally married.220 As a result, 
in many states without marriage equality, children being raised by same-sex couples 
had two parents, but one of those parents had no parental rights.221 
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This denial of parental rights to one of a child’s parents had real consequences. In 
case of emergencies, schools and hospitals could refuse to recognize one of an in-
jured child’s parents as having decision-making authority.222 This could delay the 
start of necessary medical treatment. Furthermore, if the child’s sole legally recog-
nized parent were to die, the state could take a child away from his or her surviving 
parent, who had no legal relationship despite the familial bonds.223 In such cases, the 
child could lose both parents—one by death and one by forcible legal removal—and 
the only family he or she had ever known, simply because the child’s parents were 
forbidden from marrying.224 Conversely, if the nonlegally recognized parent were to 
die, the child would be denied certain entitlements that would automatically flow to 
the child if the deceased parent had been legally recognized.225 In either case, chil-
dren suffer more when both of their parents are not legally recognized, because the 
same-sex couple cannot marry.226 
The absence of marriage rights can also affect parental status when a same-sex 
couple moves. In addition to legal adoption, parental rights may be established 
through legal presumptions, namely that a person married to the woman giving birth 
is the presumed legal parent of the child.227 As judicial judgments, adoptions by par-
ents in a same-sex couple must generally be recognized in all states.228 However, 
parental rights created through legal presumptions are not necessarily entitled to full 
faith and credit. As a result, when a same-sex married couple secured equal parental 
rights in their home state through a legal presumption, one parent could lose his or 
her parental rights upon crossing the border into some states that didn’t recognize 
same-sex marriage.229 This could make simple family vacations treacherous because 
the family unit legally dissolved and reformed as the family drove across the country. 
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couples.” (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013)). 
 227. See generally Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (2016). 
 228. V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016). 
 229. Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent Families 
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The Obergefell dissenters’ argument is bewildering given that the primary argu-
ment made by opponents of marriage equality was that marriage is necessary to raise 
children. The dissenters essentially delinked marriage and child-rearing by asserting 
that same-sex parents can raise their children perfectly fine without marriage, which 
completely undermines the primary justification advanced for same-sex marriage 
bans. Of course, this was always a fallacious defense because denying the children 
of same-sex couples the stability of marriage does nothing to increase the stability of 
heterosexual-led households. Instead, denying marriage to same-sex couples harms 
their children.230 As the Obergefell majority explained, “[w]ithout the recognition, 
stability, and predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing 
their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of 
being raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a more difficult and uncertain family 
life.”231 The Obergefell dissenters never explained why the children of opposite-sex 
parents need the stability of married parents, but the children of same-sex parents do not.  
Finally, same-sex couples cannot “raise their children in peace” when courts le-
gally forbid children to be in the presence of one parent’s same-sex partner, as hap-
pens in some custody battles.232 In short, the claim that unmarried same-sex couples 
can “raise their families as they see fit” is false. 
3. Approximating Marriage Through Legal Documents 
Justice Thomas asserted that same-sex couples could easily create many of the 
benefits of legal marriage through contracts and other legal documents. He claimed 
that states have not “prevented petitioners from approximating a number of incidents 
of marriage through private legal means, such as wills, trusts, and powers of attor-
ney.”233 His dissent belies a fundamental ignorance about the legal lives of same-sex 
couples in the decades before marriage equality. 
Justice Thomas’s facile approach to contract-as-marriage substitute is fundamen-
tally flawed for several reasons. First, the process of trying to replicate marriage 
benefits through contracts is itself extremely burdensome. As the Washington 
Supreme Court observed: 
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 232. See supra notes 204–07. 
 233. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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many day-to-day decisions that are routine for married couples are more 
complex, more agonizing, and more costly for same-sex couples. A mar-
ried person may be entitled to health care and other benefits through a 
spouse. A married person’s property may pass to the other upon death 
through intestacy laws or under community property laws or agreements. 
Married couples may execute community property agreements and dura-
ble powers of attorney for medical emergencies without fear they will 
not be honored on the basis the couple is of the same sex and unmarried. 
Unlike heterosexual couples who automatically have the advantages of 
such laws upon marriage, whether they have children or not, same-sex 
couples do not have the same rights with regard to their life partners that 
facilitate practical day-to-day living, involving such things as medical 
conditions and emergencies (which may become of more concern with 
aging), basic property transactions, and devolution of property upon 
death.234 
The requirement to execute private contracts can impose “significant financial and 
estate planning obstacles” on same-sex couples denied the ability to marry.235 Those 
same-sex couples that cannot afford a lawyer may be unable to procure and execute 
the necessary legal documents.236 Many same-sex couples mistakenly believe that 
their partners would inherit their property intestate and are thus less likely to protect 
themselves through private measures.237 After all, opposite-sex couples can gain in-
heritance rights in some states through common law marriage, which is denied to 
same-sex couples.238 
Second, many benefits of marriage cannot be replicated through contracts. For 
example, state (and federal) tax benefits and prison visitation rights cannot be secured 
through private contracts between same-sex partners.239 Same-sex partners were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 234. Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 985 (Wash. 2006). 
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2017] DISSENTING FROM HISTORY  1043 
 
denied survivor benefits when their partners died in the line of duty.240 Even legally 
married same-sex couples were sometimes denied federal rights if they resided in a 
state that banned same-sex marriage. For example, after Windsor invalidated DOMA 
and provided that the federal government would recognize same-sex marriage, states 
without marriage equality were able to evade the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) and effectively prevent gay employees from taking unpaid leave to care for 
a sick spouse.241 In light of the Obergefell ruling, the Attorneys General of Texas, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Nebraska dropped their litigation to prevent 
same-sex couples from taking advantage of the FMLA.242 
Moreover, even when the two parties in a same-sex relationship contract with 
each other, this does not create rights with respect to third parties. For example, if a 
third party wrongfully killed or injured one’s lawful spouse, the surviving (or un-
injured) spouse could sue the tortfeasor for wrongful death or loss of consortium. 
However, in most jurisdictions without marriage equality, the unmarried couple 
could not contract to make third parties so liable.243 As a result, a gay person would 
suffer the loss of a life partner without legal recourse. 
Furthermore, even when same-sex couples execute contracts to protect their 
rights, third parties often ignored these documents, sometimes with devastating re-
sults.244 For example, Bill Flanigan and Robert Daniel were registered as domestic 
partners in their home city of San Francisco when the couple was visiting 
Washington D.C. and Robert became critically ill.245 Although Bill had Robert's 
medical power of attorney, the emergency room staff at the University of Maryland 
Health Care System refused to share Robert’s information or even let Bill see his 
dying partner.246 Bill was denied access until hours later when Robert’s mother ar-
rived and demanded that Bill be admitted. By then, Robert was unconscious and died 
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without ever knowing that Bill was desperately trying to say goodbye.247 If they had 
been married, this never would have happened.248 Bill and Robert’s ordeal is not 
unique.249 In too many cases, “Hospitals, employers and other institutions will say, 
‘We don’t care what the law says, you are not married.’”250 Legal documents are not 
a substitute for marriage because many administrators refuse to read these papers and 
simply deny access to long-term partners, often forcing people to die alone, unaware 
that their loved one is in another room anxiously trying to get to them.251 In the 
context of elderly gays, one report found that in ten percent of reported cases, nursing 
home staff ignored a medical power of attorney when it was assigned to a resident’s 
same-sex partner.252 Ultimately, private agreements provide less predictability and 
less protection than marriage rights.253 
Finally, several states tried to make resort to private arrangements more difficult. 
While some states allowed same-sex couples to contract with respect to property 
rights,254 several states enacted so-called super-DOMAs that included in “state 
constitution[s] not just a ban on same-sex marriage but also anything ‘like marriage,’ 
such as domestic partnerships.”255 For example, Michigan’s DOMA provided that 
“the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement rec-
ognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”256 The Michigan Supreme 
Court interpreted this to mean that—because same-sex unions could not be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 247. Id.  
 248. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE?: THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE 
OVER GAY EQUALITY (2005) (“Because they were never allowed to marry and because any-
thing less than marriage is still seen as less significant, Bill and Robert never got to say good-
bye to one another.”). 
 249. See Shawna S. Baker, Where Conscience Meets Desire: Refusal of Health Care Pro-
viders To Honor Health Care Proxies for Sexual Minorities, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 8–9 
(2009) (discussing the ordeal of Janice Langbehn and Lisa Pond: “For eight hours, Janice and 
the children waited in the hospital’s emergency room. For eight hours, each and every one of 
Janice’s attempts to be with her partner were thwarted. For eight hours, the hospital denied 
Lisa’s three children access to their mother’s bedside. For eight hours, Lisa lay dying alone.”); 
Reed v. ANM Health Care, 225 P.3d 1012, 1012 (Wash. App. 2008). 
 250. Tina Kelley, Couples Not Rushing to Civil Unions in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 21, 2007) (quoting Steven Goldstein, Chairman of Garden State Equality), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/nyregion/21civil.html [https://perma.cc/F6TK-RQL9]. 
Hospital staffs withhold information from partners that is freely given to spouses. See Lewis 
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 202 (N.J. 2006). Same-sex couples are sometimes forced to lie and 
claim to be siblings in order to secure hospital visitations and participation in medical decision-
making. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 874 (N.M. 2013). 
 251. See DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 155 (2004). 
 252. New Report Shows Long-Term Care Facilities Aren’t Safe for LGBT Elders, NLCR 
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.nclrights.org/new-report-shows-long-term-care-facilities-arent-
safe-for-lgbt-elders/ [https://perma.cc/85JP-NGK9]. 
 253. Fellows et al., supra note 236, at 18 (“Although persons in committed relationships 
can protect their respective interests under current law through private agreements, the protec-
tions fall short of the predictability and enforceability provided to persons who are married.”). 
 254. See Forum for Equal. PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715, 737 (La. 2005) (Calogero, 
C.J., concurring). 
 255. AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX 131 (2012). 
 256. MICH. CONST. Art. 1, § 25 (West). 
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recognized “for any purpose”—Michigan “prohibits public employers from 
providing health-insurance benefits to their employees’ qualified same-sex domestic 
partners.”257 The law prevented both the state and local governments of Michigan 
from providing benefits to the same-sex partners of employees in their contracts.258  
Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban seemed to go even further. It provided that any 
“civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons of the 
same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and 
any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and unenforceable.”259 As 
Jonathan Rauch explained, “[o]n its face, the law could interfere with wills, medical 
directives, powers of attorney, child custody and property arrangements, even per-
haps joint bank accounts. If a gay Californian was hit by a bus in Arlington, her 
medical power of attorney might be worthless there.”260 Other states similarly sought 
to interfere with the contractual rights of same-sex couples.261 At a minimum, such 
laws created anxiety and uncertainty for same-sex couples.262 
In sum, private contracts, wills, and powers of attorney are not satisfactory sub-
stitutes for marriage. Thomas was wrong to imply that they were. 
4. Private Religious Ceremonies 
Thomas asserted that same-sex marriage bans did not interfere with religious lib-
erty because gay couples could hold private religious ceremonies, albeit without con-
ferring any actual legal rights or benefits upon the couples. Thomas claimed that 
states have not restricted the ability of same-sex couples “to make vows to their 
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partners in public ceremonies [or] to engage in religious wedding ceremo-
nies . . . .”263 Specifically, he asserted that the Obergefell petitioners “have been able 
to hold . . . private religious ceremonies in all States.”264  
Justice Thomas again oversimplified the legal landscape. First, a same-sex couple 
could face legal consequences for holding a private religious wedding ceremony. The 
case of Robin Shahar is the best known example. As a top law student from Emory 
Law School, Shahar spent her second summer of law school working at the Georgia 
Attorney General’s office. She received and accepted an offer of a permanent job. In 
the months before her start date, Shahar was planning her wedding to another woman 
to be performed by the couple’s rabbi.265 Upon learning of Shahar’s religious cere-
mony, Attorney General Michael Bowers terminated Shahar’s already-accepted job 
offer because Georgia did not recognize same-sex marriages.266 Shahar never 
claimed to be legally married; she never claimed to be entitled to any of the rights or 
benefits associated with marriage. Instead, she participated in a religious ceremony, 
the kind that Thomas claimed same-sex couples have a right to engage in even with-
out same-sex marriage rights. Nevertheless, Shahar was punished by her government 
employer, and when Shahar sued, the Eleventh Circuit rejected her claims that the 
revocation of her offer violated her First Amendment rights, as well as her rights to 
equal protection and substantive due process.267 
Second, many states prohibited officiants—including clergy—from solemnizing 
same-sex marriages, even when the marriage was religious, not legal, in nature.268 
Before Obergefell, it was unclear whether clergy could be criminally liable for per-
forming a religious marriage for same-sex couples.269 One clergyman in Michigan, 
for example, sued to challenge Michigan’s law, because such “laws prohibit or dis-
courage him from performing private religious marriage ceremonies, including for 
those in same-sex . . . relationships, because he might face civil and criminal penalties 
for doing so.”270 This is reminiscent of the provision in Virginia’s miscegenation 
regime that Thomas found troubling.271 
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In sum, Thomas was too quick to claim that same-sex couples could participate 
in religious ceremonies without negative consequence in the same way that different-
sex couples could. 
5. Hold Themselves Out As Married  
In addition to his claim that same-sex couples could participate in private religious 
ceremonies, Justice Thomas also claimed that states had not restricted the ability of 
same-sex couples “to hold themselves out as married . . . .”272 This is a curious argu-
ment; Thomas voted to deny same-sex couples the legal ability to marry but asserted 
that these couples could nonetheless tell the world that they were, in fact, married. 
Both his premise and his conclusion are wrong. 
With respect to his premise, Thomas is wrong that same-sex couples could easily 
hold themselves out as married. One way that couples hold themselves out as married 
is by sharing a common last name. Sharing a last name allows a couple to communi-
cate their commitment to the world and show that they represent a family. Before 
Obergefell, some courts had held it unlawful and “against public policy to even allow 
the petitioner and the lifetime partner to [hold] themselves out as being married” by 
adopting a common last name.273 In amicus briefs opposing specific requests by 
same-sex couples to change their names, religious conservatives accused gay couples 
of “using the change of name statute as a Trojan horse in a political agenda designed 
in derogation of values inherent in heterosexual marriage.”274 In many cases, appel-
late courts reversed lower courts’ rejections of same-sex couples’ applications to 
share a common last name.275 While ultimately reaching a correct legal result, this 
forces same-sex couples to wait and to spend significant amounts of money for a 
right that is perfunctory for married couples. 
Despite same-sex couples’ successes in some states’ appellate courts, before 
Obergefell, other states effectively invoked their same-sex marriage bans to prevent 
committed couples from holding themselves out as married by sharing a last name. 
For example, Scott and Daniel Wall-DeSousa had legally married in New York and 
had their new hyphenated last names on their Florida drivers’ licenses. When it heard 
what the couple had done, the Florida “DMV sent a letter threatening to revoke their 
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licenses if they did not reapply in their former names [because] Florida law prohibits 
recognition of same-sex marriages from any jurisdiction and for any purpose.”276 
When Daniel refused to remove his hyphenated name from his—legally issued—
Florida drivers license, the State cancelled his driving privileges indefinitely.277 
Although they were legally married in New York, the Florida DMV sent the couple 
a letter stating that their marriage “certificate from another state is not considered as 
a legal basis for a name change on a Florida driver license.”278  
Furthermore, Thomas was wrong to imply that holding oneself out as married in 
any way compensates for being denied the legal right to marry. Marriage confers 
significant material benefits on couples, both legal and social. Applying the label 
“married” to an unmarried couple does not bestow social recognition equivalent to 
marriage upon the couple.279 Moreover, holding oneself out as married confers none 
of the legal benefits of marriage.  
Finally, Thomas was wrong to suggest that same-sex couples could hold them-
selves out as married without repercussions. The case of Robin Shahar again is pro-
phetic. Michael Bowers, the Georgia Attorney General, punished Shahar for holding 
herself out as married.280 Bowers asserted that “[t]o hold yourself out as married 
when you can’t be is to flaunt [sic] the law.”281 He elaborated, “I’m not going to hire 
someone who holds themself out to the public by their own admission as being en-
gaged in a homosexual marriage.”282 It is noteworthy that Shahar’s temple consid-
ered Shahar and her partner to be married in the eyes of their religion. Shahar herself 
made this distinction, noting that she was religiously married, not legally married. 
Yet Bowers punished her nonetheless.  
In another example, Tracy Thorne-Begland, a prosecutor in Richmond, Virginia 
who was nominated to be a judge, was punished by state legislators for holding him-
self out as married to his partner. Because Thorne-Begland lived with his partner, 
with whom he was raising two children,283 Delegate Bob Marshall successfully killed 
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the nomination in the Virginia House of Delegates by arguing that the nominee was 
improperly “hold[ing] himself out as being married,” and that this was in “contradic-
tion to the requirement of submission to the [Virginia] constitution,” which forbids 
same-sex marriage.284 Neither Shahar nor Thorne-Begland were engaging in any de-
ception but each was nonetheless punished for revealing their commitment with their 
partners. Neither couple was claiming the legal benefits of marriage, but merely hold-
ing themselves out as half of a couple in a committed relationship. Both were penal-
ized, thus disproving Thomas’s assertion that same-sex couples can necessarily hold 
themselves out as married. 
6. Travel 
Similar to his assertion that same-sex couples can live together without restraint, 
Justice Thomas also claimed that same-sex couples “have been able to travel freely 
around the country, making their homes where they please.”285 Again, Thomas mis-
represented how gay lives are lived in America.286 
The ability of same-sex couples to travel is complicated when some states refuse 
to recognize same-sex marriages. A couple can be legally married in one state and 
yet be treated as unmarried should the couple move to a state without marriage equal-
ity.287 Same-sex couples cannot travel to some states because one parent will lose 
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parental rights over the couple’s children.288 In states without marriage equality, legal 
documents are more likely to be ignored and gay people are more likely to die 
alone.289 
Recognizing these hardships, several pre-Obergefell courts held that “the funda-
mental right to marry necessarily includes the right to remain married.”290 The 
Obergefell dissenters would have rolled back this line of authority and stripped mar-
ried couples of their legal status should they travel into non-equality states. This gives 
the lie to Thomas’s assertion that same-sex couples could “travel freely around the 
country, making their homes where they please.” This is true only to the extent that 
same-sex couples are willing to have their previously-legal marriages become invalid 
and to have their families not legally recognized. That is hardly traveling freely 
where one pleases. 
7. The Right To Be Left Alone 
The Obergefell dissenters concluded with sweeping declarations about the ease 
of gay life and the superfluity of marriage equality. Roberts asserted same-sex mar-
riage bans do not meaningfully affect gay couples because “the laws in no way inter-
fere with the ‘right to be let alone.’”291 Thomas parroted that “Petitioners . . . have 
been left alone to order their lives as they see fit.”292 These are awfully strident proc-
lamations on how carefree life was for gay couples denied access to marriage. 
Thomas specifically claimed that states have not restricted the ability of same-sex 
couples “to enter same-sex relationships”293 and “to engage in intimate behavior.”294 
This claim is particularly ironic because until 2003, over a dozen states did criminal-
ize exactly such behavior until the Supreme Court applied substantive due process to 
invalidate sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas.295 Justice Thomas voted to uphold the 
constitutionality of sodomy laws. In other words, Thomas opposed any right for 
same-sex couples to be left alone, but he then invoked this right to deny same-sex 
couples the right to marry. 
More importantly, Thomas’s factual assertions are again wrong. States did not 
leave gay couples alone to live in peace. Because they were denied marriage rights, 
same-sex couples lived in greater fear that a partner would die alone because hospital 
workers would ignore their legal rights; that their children could be taken away from 
them; that they could be penalized for having a religious ceremony or holding them-
selves out as married; or that their legal documents would be ignored.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 288. In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682–83 (Sur. Ct. 2009). 
 289. See supra notes 244–53. 
 290. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). 
 291. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added). 
 292. Id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 293. Id.  
 294. Id. 
 295. 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“[T]he protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause 
has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.”). 
2017] DISSENTING FROM HISTORY  1051 
 
B. Understanding the Dissenters’ Whitewashing of Anti-Gay Discrimination 
The Obergefell dissenters misrepresented the lives of gay Americans and gay cou-
ples. In response to the personal stories and the public policy analyses demonstrating 
the harms imposed by same-sex marriage bans, Thomas and Roberts tried to create 
a counter-narrative that same-sex couples were able to live lives on par with opposite-
sex couples. The dissenters sought to make same-sex marriage seem unnecessary.  
Their narrative plays into—and legitimizes—the false narrative created by oppo-
nents of equality that gays in America do not deserve any legal protection because 
their lives are privileged and they face no discrimination.296 Scalia made this argu-
ment in his Romer dissent when he opined that Colorado could constitutionally strip 
gays of non-discrimination protections in part because they “have high disposable 
income” and “possess political power much greater than their numbers.”297 This 
picked up on the state’s argument that gay Coloradans should be excluded from non-
discrimination protections because they are not discriminated against.298 This is now 
a common refrain in campaigns to prevent the inclusion of sexual orientation in non-
discrimination ordinances.299 
Perhaps the Obergefell dissenters were attempting to build a foundation for the 
argument that sexual orientation should not be considered a suspect classification 
because gays are not discriminated against. One of the factors for suspect classifica-
tion is whether the class has suffered a history of discrimination. At least one court 
has asserted that this factor counsels against applying heightened scrutiny to anti-gay 
laws because of recent gains.300 Discounting the discrimination imposed on gay 
Americans could make it less likely that courts will strike down anti-gay laws of the 
sort that the Obergefell dissenters have supported in every gay rights case that has 
reached the Supreme Court. 
No one should learn gay history from the Obergefell dissents. These sections of 
the dissents are bare of any citation to any scholarship, any case law, or any source 
for a reason: they present a false history. American society and every level of gov-
ernment have historically treated gay people cruelly and often barbarically. Gay peo-
ple have been castrated, lobotomized, tortured though electroshock therapy, and dis-
criminated against in almost every facet of their lives.301 Recent years have brought 
much improvement but, in many parts of the country, invidious discrimination still 
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prevails. The national movement to prevent marriage equality was but one aspect of 
this history of discrimination. This movement was driven in large part by an un-
restrained desire to condemn and mistreat gay people, as Part IV discusses. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE DEBATE OVER SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The Obergefell dissenters also attempted to rewrite the history of the national de-
bate over marriage equality for same-sex couples. Justice Scalia lamented that 
“[u]ntil the courts put a stop to it, public debate over same-sex marriage displayed 
American democracy at its best. Individuals on both sides of the issue passionately, 
but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their views.”302 
Roberts condemned the Obergefell majority for effectively stopping this “vibrant 
debate.”303 Similarly, Justice Thomas asserted that same-sex marriage bans were not 
anti-gay304 and did not have a “sordid history,” as did miscegenation laws.305 In the 
dissenters’ telling, the national campaign to pass DOMA and to amend state consti-
tutions to prohibit same-sex marriage was respectful, vibrant, and not anti-gay. Don’t 
believe them. 
The Obergefell dissenters attempted to use their Supreme Court writings to white-
wash the history of animus, invective, and lies that animated the national push to ban 
same-sex marriage. The national debate over marriage equality began when 
Congress proposed the misnamed Defense of Marriage Act in response to the Hawaii 
Supreme Court holding that the state’s same-sex marriage ban constituted gender 
discrimination would have to survive heightened scrutiny.306 Congress sought to en-
sure that neither the federal government nor other states would have to recognize 
same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii or any other state that legalized same-sex 
marriages. Debating DOMA on the floor of the House of Representatives, “members 
of Congress repeatedly voiced their disapproval of homosexuality, calling it ‘im-
moral,’ ‘depraved,’ ‘unnatural,’ ‘based on perversion,’ and ‘an attack upon God’s 
principles.’”307 Representative Barr accused “homosexual extremists” of leading a 
“direct assault” against “an institution basic not only to this country’s foundation and 
to its survival but to every Western civilization,” while openly gay representative 
Studds noted that words like “promiscuity, perversion, hedonism, narcissism . . . de-
pravity and sin” had been “thrown around” by opponents of marriage equality.308 
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Some congressmen openly condemned homosexuality as “immoral and harmful.”309 
Given their expressed anti-gay feelings, DOMA supporters seemed more intent on 
hurting same-sex couples than defending marriage. When striking down DOMA in 
Windsor, the Supreme Court noted: 
The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are 
to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who 
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority 
of the States. The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demon-
strate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a 
dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, 
was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its 
essence.310 
Like DOMA, state same-sex marriage bans were motivated by animus against 
same-sex couples and gay Americans more broadly.311 During the house floor debate 
in Washington state, for example, the legislature’s prime sponsor of that state’s same-
sex marriage ban “told the legislature’s only openly gay member that homosexuals 
should be put on a boat and shipped out of the country.”312 In legal briefs before the 
Tenth Circuit, attorneys supporting same-sex marriage bans approvingly quoted the 
Bible for the proposition that same-sex sexual activity is “an abomination” whose 
participants should be killed.313 On the day of the Obergefell oral argument, oppo-
nents of marriage equality held signs in front of the Supreme Court proclaiming that 
“Homo Sex Is Sin” and “Your Sin of Sodomy Is Worthy of Death” among other 
slanders.314 Within the Court itself, just as Solicitor General Donald Verrilli was set 
to begin his argument, a man stood up and starting yelling, “If you support gay mar-
riage, you will burn in hell!”315 The Supreme Court Justices knew firsthand the tone 
of the debate. One wonders, if this is civil debate, what does incivility look like? 
The most inflammatory lie told to generate opposition to same-sex marriage was 
that gay people are child molesters who will assault children if gay marriage is legally 
recognized. One of the main promoters of California’s Proposition 8 asserted that 
voters must oppose same-sex marriage because “homosexuals are twelve times more 
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likely to molest children.”316 Opponents of marriage equality have accused gay 
Americans of being child molesters in their legal briefs317 and in their campaign lit-
erature.318 This was a retread of long-used fabrication that gay people should not be 
allowed to marry, to teach, or to be near children because they molest children.319 
This “molestation libel” is a lie that “has been thoroughly discredited.”320 Profes-
sor William Eskridge has explained that the molestation lie “is the most vicious anti-
gay myth, not only because it is false, but also because it is an inversion of the 
data.”321 Unfortunately, the molestation accusation was just one of many lies told by 
opponents of marriage equality. As the Montana Supreme Court observed, “[t]he 
scare tactics, misinformation, and propaganda used by the promoters of the Marriage 
Amendment were then, and remain now, not only false, but patently absurd as 
well.”322 These false claims hurt gay people, especially parents, who were routinely 
called evil and dangerous to children.323 The molestation libel also disproves Scalia’s 
assertion that opponents of marriage equality were respectful. 
Roberts sought to show the civil nature of the debate over same-sex marriage by 
denying that any disrespectful arguments were made by the opponents of marriage 
equality. Specifically, he declared that the Obergefell “opinion describes the ‘trans-
cendent importance’ of marriage and repeatedly insists that petitioners do not seek 
to ‘demean,’ ‘devalue,’ ‘denigrate,’ or ‘disrespect’ the institution. Nobody disputes 
those points.”324 Roberts’s claim is interesting because it is so adamant and so easily 
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disproven. Throughout the national debate over marriage equality, gays were accused 
precisely of demeaning, devaluing, and denigrating the institution of marriage. 
Opponents of same-sex marriage argued vociferously that marriage equality de-
means marriage. In enacting DOMA, members of Congress “argued that marriage 
by gays and lesbians would ‘demean’ and ‘trivialize’ heterosexual mar-
riage and might indeed be ‘the final blow to the American family.’”325 In an ex-
change with openly gay Representative Barney Frank, Representative Henry Hyde 
asserted that same-sex marriage “demeans the institution . . . . The institution of mar-
riage is trivialized by same-sex marriage.”326 Representative Smith famously pro-
claimed that “Same-sex ‘marriages’ demean the fundamental institution of marriage. 
They legitimize unnatural and immoral behavior. And they trivialize marriage as a 
mere ‘lifestyle choice.’ The institution of marriage sets a necessary and high stand-
ard. Anything that lowers this standard, as same-sex ‘marriages’ do, inevitably belit-
tles marriage.”327 The House Report on DOMA claimed that allowing same-sex mar-
riage “trivializes the legitimate status of marriage and demeans it by putting a stamp 
of approval . . . on a union that many people . . . think is immoral.”328  
The proponents of same-sex marriage bans and DOMA similarly argued that gay 
unions would devalue marriage. For example, the California Supreme Court noted 
that amici defending California’s ban on same-sex marriage argued “that recognizing 
that the constitutional right to marry applies to same-sex couples ‘will eventually 
devalue the institution [of marriage] to the detriment of children.’”329 Similarly, the 
drafters of Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage asserted that “the provision of ‘same 
sex unions would obscure certain basic moral values and further devalue the institu-
tion of marriage and the status of children.’”330 The DOMA supporters in Congress 
not only argued that same-sex marriage would devalue marriage but they would 
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“devalue the love between a man and a woman and weaken us as a Nation.”331 In 
sync with religious conservative leaders,332 the leading legal academic defender of 
marriage bans argued that “[a]nother general social effect of legalizing same-sex 
civil unions is the enhancement and increase in the devaluation of marriage.”333 Sev-
eral politicians, such as California’s then-Governor Pete Wilson argued that even 
“domestic partner benefits ‘devalu[ed] the institution of marriage and the family.’”334 
Based on this argument, then-Governor Wilson vetoed a domestic partnership bill 
that “would have provided very limited rights such as hospital visitation to same-sex 
couples.”335 
Finally, Roberts was also wrong to assert that no one claimed that same-sex mar-
riage would denigrate traditional marriage. In the Obergefell case itself, the states 
defended their marriage bans by asserting that only heterosexual couples need the 
stability of marriage in the case of accidental procreation. When the Sixth Circuit 
judges “asked counsel why that goal required the simultaneous exclusion of same-
sex couples from marrying, we were told that permitting same-sex marriage might 
denigrate the institution of marriage in the eyes of opposite-sex couples who con-
ceive out of wedlock, causing subsequent abandonment of the unintended offspring 
by one or both biological parents.”336 You read that correctly: a primary defense of 
same-sex marriage bans was that same-sex marriages would denigrate marriage so 
much that heterosexual parents will abandon their biological children. Roberts can-
not credibly claim that he was unaware of such arguments—they are referenced in 
the actual Sixth Circuit opinion that the Supreme Court was considering in 
Obergefell. 
In sum, the Obergefell dissenters failed to appreciate the history of the national 
and statewide debates over same-sex marriage. These dissents should not serve as 
any part of the historical record of how the debate over same-sex marriage actually 
transpired. In the wake of Romer, most savvy opponents of equal rights have taken 
greater efforts to conceal their animus towards their neighbors and fellow citizens 
who happen to be gay. But their true colors still sometimes shine through. The dis-
senters either ignored the invective hurled against gay Americans or they believed that 
slandering millions of gay Americans as child molesters is somehow “respectful.” 
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CONCLUSION 
The Obergefell dissenters collectively sought to rewrite the histories of marriage, 
of constitutional law, of the debate over same-sex marriage, and of the legal treat-
ment of same-sex couples. Their motivation is evident: Through a combination of 
ignoring and misrepresenting Loving and the nation’s history of miscegenation laws, 
the dissenters tried to make the Obergefell opinion appear to be an unprecedented 
and antidemocratic power grab by the federal courts. By misrepresenting the diffi-
culty of gay life in America, they sought to make marriage equality—and non-
discrimination laws that include sexual orientation—unnecessary. By misrepresent-
ing the cruelty of the campaign against same-sex marriage, the Obergefell dissenters 
sought to make opponents of civil rights appear both respectful and respectable. Fu-
ture generations should not read the Obergefell dissents and believe that the Oberge-
fell majority ended a civil debate. 
If the Obergefell dissents have value as historical documents, it is not as an accu-
rate chronicle of history but rather as a cautionary tale of how the desire to discrimi-
nate can be so powerful as to blind people to historical truths. 
